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The Adoption and Impact 
of Advanced Emergency 
Response Services 
Susan Athey and Scott Stern 
4.1  Introduction 
Emergency response services, provided through 91 1 calling and ambu- 
lance services, serve as the first line of contact between patients suffering 
from emergency conditions and the local health care infrastructure. To- 
gether with the emergency rooms in hospitals, emergency response ser- 
vices play an important role in the health care outcomes for a number of 
emergency indications. For example, in the case of out-of-hospital cardiac 
arrest, the time lapse between collapse and the initiation of cardiopulmo- 
nary resuscitation (CPR) and defibrillation is claimed to be an important 
determinant of the probability of  survival.' In addition, the emergency 
response system plays a critical role in selecting which hospital receives 
each emergency patient, where hospitals may differ in their quality and in 
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the technologies available for emergency care. The patient benefits from 
emergency response services thus arise not only from the direct provision 
of medical and transportation services but also through the system’s role 
in allocating patients to the hospital facilities that are most appropriate 
for their particular medical condition. Furthermore, emergency response 
systems may have indirect effects on patients through their influence on 
the choices made by  hospitals, Emergency response systems affect the 
incentives of  hospitals to adopt certain technologies, such as gaining 
“trauma center” certification and introducing capabilities for the provi- 
sion of cardiac care, since these choices can potentially influence the allo- 
cation of emergency patients to hospitals. 
There exists wide variation across communities within the United States 
in terms of the level of care provided through the emergency service sys- 
tem. For example, 91 1 services are publicly funded and are almost always 
operated by local government agencies such as police or fire departments. 
At  one extreme,  some communities have  invested in  “Enhanced 911” 
(E911) systems, which link digital information about the source of the call 
with a detailed address database maintained by  the 911 center. The call 
takers see each caller’s address and location on a computer screen almost 
instantaneously when the call is received. Even more advanced alterna- 
tives are available, including computer-aided ambulance dispatching. At 
the other extreme, there are many communities that have not invested even 
in a “Basic 91 1” capability. In these environments, individuals attempting 
to contact the local medical emergency infrastructure must locate and dial 
a seven-digit number. When the call is received, the call taker manually 
searches for and contacts the ambulance that is closest to the emergency 
and has the appropriate equipment. Likewise, we see substantial heteroge- 
neity in the availability of in-hospital emergency services across communi- 
ties. Although the American Heart Association has advocated the adop- 
tion of Enhanced 91 1 as the first step in a “chain of survival” for cardiac 
incidents (Cummins et al. 1991), there has been little systematic evidence 
presented about the benefits of 91 1 services2 
The principal aim of this paper is to evaluate the determinants and im- 
plications of differences in the prehospital and in-hospital emergency ser- 
vices adopted in a given community. To accomplish this goal, we evaluate 
the incentives to adopt emergency response systems and in-hospital tech- 
nology, as well as the productivity gains from these investments. We focus 
in particular on the productivity and adoption of Basic and Enhanced 91 1 
services, services that entail investments in information technology and 
telecommunications equipment. 
2. For an exception, see Joslyn, Pomrehn, and Brown (1993), who find in a sample of 1,753 
Iowa patients that 91 1 reduces response time, time to CPR,  and time to defibrillation, as 
well as mortality. This study has a limited number of county-level covariates, however, leaving 
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As a service enabled by  investment in information technology, emer- 
gency response systems belong to the substantial portion of the economy 
that has defied accurate productivity measurement (Griliches 1994; Bres- 
nahan and Gordon  1997). For most  services (including emergency re- 
sponse), it is difficult to measure quality. Each consumer’s valuation can 
depend on several factors that are difficult to observe, such as timeliness 
and the location of service delivery as well as on the extent to which the 
product is customized to the individual. In the case of 91 1 services, how- 
ever, we are able to address some of these challenges using a unique combi- 
nation of data sources. The primary database is composed of a set of am- 
bulance calls responding to reported cardiac incidents in Pennsylvania 
in 1995. These ambulance records have been linked with hospital billing 
records, hospital characteristics, and data about the level of  91 1 technol- 
ogy available in the county in which the call took place. We use this data 
to document how 91 1 is related to the benefits provided by the emergency 
response system, including its relationship to lower response times, more 
appropriate allocation of patients to hospitals, and reduced mortality of 
cardiac patients. 
Our analysis focuses on relatively simple, reduced-form procedures. We 
begin by exploring the sources of heterogeneity in the allocation of 91 1 
services to different localities. We  find that 911 is allocated not only ac- 
cording to factors that might increase their technical efficiency (such as the 
number of residents per county) but also according to a county’s political 
orientation. In particular, communities  with more conservative voting pat- 
terns are less likely to adopt advanced 91 1 systems. Although we  do not 
perform a formal cost-benefit analysis, these results suggest that public 
policies concerning 91 1 systems can potentially increase the efficiency of 
the diffusion process. For example, some of  the barriers to adoption in- 
clude the lack of incentives and information faced by county government 
officials, problems that could potentially be remedied at relatively low cost. 
We then turn to analyze the productivity benefits from adopting Basic 
and Enhanced 9 11 systems, taking the patient as the unit of the analysis. 
We  begin by  studying the effects of  the county-level 911 system on the 
time it takes to respond to cardiac emergencies and transport the patient 
to the hospital, factors that are an important component of the quality of 
emergency medical services. The detailed nature of the data set allows us 
to control for a variety of patient characteristics, as well as for features of 
the county, such as the hospital infrastructure and demographic  character- 
istics. 
We show that an ambulance arrives at the scene of a cardiac emergency 
5 percent faster in counties with Enhanced 911 as opposed to no 911 or 
Basic 911. Even larger gains are measured when we  restrict our sample 
solely to those counties that changed their level of 91 1 technology during 
our sample period. Moreover, patients are transported from the scene of 116  Susan Athey and  Scott Stern 
an incident to the hospital approximately 10 percent faster in  counties 
with Enhanced 91 1 as opposed to lower levels of 91 1. 
Our findings regarding the relationship between 91 1 and mortality are 
more subtle. First, we are unable to establish a direct reduced-form statisti- 
cal relationship between the level of 911 in a given county and patient 
mortality. Of course, this may be due to the fact that the overall mortality 
rate is relatively low (approximately 7 percent) and only a small portion 
of our sample resides in counties with no 91 1 technology (approximately 
20 percent), making it difficult to infer the impact of the technology level 
on the mortality rate. However, our analysis of the impact of 91 1 on re- 
sponse time suggests an alternative strategy: We use the adoption of 91 1 
as an instrument for an individual’s response time in the patient mortality 
regressions. In particular, we  show that 91 1 technology affects response 
time, and we can assume that 91 1 adoption is unrelated to the severity of 
a particular patient. Our preliminary instrumental variables analysis of 
the effect of response time on mortality finds that shorter response times 
do indeed reduce mortality. While this analysis is still exploratory, we 
believe that the use  of  county-level infrastructure as an instrument for 
individual-level services is a potentially fruitful approach for further ex- 
ploration. 
Beyond its direct effects on response time and mortality, a second role 
of the emergency response system is to allocate patients to hospitals. From 
a hospital’s perspective, the emergency response system affects both the 
size and characteristics of its pool of emergency patients; the sensitivity of 
the allocation process to the hospital characteristics will also interact with 
the incentives of a hospital to adopt certain technologies. We  thus take 
several preliminary steps toward exploring these effects. 
Our first result about allocation is that patient severity affects the alloca- 
tion of patients to high-technology  hospitals. Our results about allocation 
have implications for our ability to draw inferences about the benefits of 
hospital technology through reduced-form analyses of the direct effect of 
technology on patient outcomes. This issue has been recognized by several 
authors, such as McClellan and Newhouse (1997), who argue that patient 
allocation to hospitals with different technologies is endogenous and so 
must be treated with an instrumental variables approach. Consistent with 
this view, our estimates provide direct evidence about the relationship be- 
tween patient severity and allocation. 
In addition, we  document that in Pennsylvania, many patients reside 
in counties that do not include a hospital with certain high-level cardiac- 
specific technologies (such as a cardiac catheterization laboratory); as a 
consequence, these patients are not treated by  hospitals with high-level 
cardiac technology in response to a cardiac emergency. It is interesting to 
observe that, in contrast to the general population, nearly all of the car- 
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cent). Instead, it seems to be  the availability of medical technology in 
nearby hospitals that most significantly limits the access of  patients to 
high levels of cardiac care in emergency situations. 
Among the patients who do have access to high levels of cardiac care 
technology, we  show that the allocation of patients to hospitals with car- 
diac catheterization laboratories depends on the presence of 91 1 services, 
where counties with higher levels of 911 technology are more likely to 
allocate patients to hospitals with higher levels of cardiac care technology. 
This can affect the incentives of hospitals to invest in high levels of tech- 
nology. While these incentives can potentially lead to increased investment 
in technology by hospitals, we do not see strong evidence of strategic  com- 
plementarity between 91 1 and hospital technology in our national sample. 
Despite the fact that the level of in-hospital emergency technology is posi- 
tively correlated with the level of 91 1 technology at the national level, most 
of that positive interrelationship is accounted for by the fact that both in- 
hospital and prehospital care respond positively to the population and 
income of a county. 
We further explore the salience of hospital incentives to adopt advanced 
technologies through a preliminary analysis of the determinants of a hos- 
pital’s share of ambulance-transported cardiac patients in a given county. 
We  find evidence that a hospital’s “market share” is sensitive both to its 
overall level of emergency room technology as well as its level of cardiac- 
specific technology. In addition, increases in the level  of technology by 
rival hospitals (other hospitals in the same county) have a negative impact 
on hospital market share. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 4.2, we 
motivate our analysis more fully by introducing the institutional context 
of  emergency response  systems,  outlining the  principal  technological 
choices faced by  these systems and local hospitals, and suggesting the 
main economic issues that arise in the analysis of these systems. Section 
4.3 presents the data that we will use to conduct the analysis. Sections 4.4, 
4.5, and 4.6 consider the determinants of adoption of emergency response 
systems, our analysis of productivity, and the role of the emergency re- 
sponse system in allocating patients to hospitals. Our concluding remarks 
suggest a number of directions for future research. 
4.2  Emergency Response Systems: Background and Motivation 
The goal of this section is to motivate our empirical analysis of emer- 
gency response systems through a description of the background and in- 
stitutions of prehospital care. To do so, we  review the operation of the 
emergency medical response system (in most communities, a 91 1 system), 
focusing in particular on potential productivity benefits. We  further dis- 
cuss the interaction between prehospital and in-hospital emergency care. 118  Susan Athey and Scott Stern 
Finally, we  describe the factors that lead to heterogeneity in the adoption 
of 911. 
Emergency response systems are a public service providing a standard- 
ized and integrated method for local communities to respond to emergen- 
cies. Until the late 1960s, emergencies  were reported to a telephone opera- 
tor  (whose training and equipment usually did not accommodate the 
efficient handling of emergency) or by directly contacting a particular pub- 
lic service agency (requiring individuals  to find the seven-digit phone num- 
ber for a particular agency and precluding integration among agencies). 
Under this ad hoc system, emergency response was often inappropriate 
to the particular situation-overreaction  to minor crises coexisted with 
frequent underreactions to critical emergencies (Gibson 1977; Siler 1975). 
Following a model developed in Europe after World War I1 (most particu- 
larly the 9-9-9 system in Great Britain), the first 91 1 systems were intro- 
duced into the United States in 1968 (in Haleyville, Alabama, and Nome, 
Alaska). Shortly thereafter, federal legislation explicitly encouraged the 
development of  911 systems in local communities and ensured that the 
Bell System would reserve 91 1 for emergency service use (Pivetta 1995). 
While the scope and particular details of many systems vary, 91 1 sys- 
tems operate according to the following standard procedure: 
An individual in an emergency dials 91 1. 
Call is answered by a Public Service Answering Point (PSAP) operator. 
A trained 91 1 call taker evaluates the caller’s emergency and gathers neces- 
sary information (location, severity, etc.). 
Call taker communicates with the appropriate emergency service agencies 
for dispatch to the emergency. 
While 9 1  1 calls can be routed to many different geographical locations, 
the adoption of 91 1 usually entails some increase in the centralization of 
call taking, to avoid duplication of fixed costs and adoption costs of the 
relevant telecommunications  equipment. Even if centralization remains un- 
changed, 91 1 almost inevitably increases the degree of coordination be- 
tween call centers. 
From the perspective of the productivity analysis for cardiac patients, 
the most important benefit of 91 1 systems is to reduce response time. Our 
focus on cardiac care allows us to assess a particular medical condition for 
which outcomes have been closely linked (at least in the clinical emergency 
services literature) to the effectiveness of the emergency response system 
and ambulance technology. According to a variety of  medical sources 
(see, e.g., Cumrnins et al. 1991; Bonnin, Pepe, and Clark 1993; and Tresch, 
Thakur, and Hoffman 1989), several medical procedures can contribute 
to survival in the case of a cardiac incident, including CPR and defibrilla- 
tion. In particular, the medical literature has tied patients’ survival proba- 
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and the administration of  CPR  and  defibrillation (Lewis et al.  1982; 
Larsen et al. 1993). While CPR can be in principle conducted by  a non- 
professional bystander (perhaps with over-the-phone instructions from a 
trained call taker), it is typically best performed by paramedics. Further- 
more, defibrillation-electrical  shock therapy to  “reset” the electrical 
activity of the heart in the case of ventricular fibrillation (irregularity)- 
requires equipment that is transported in ambulances or available in hos- 
pitals. As a result, correct administration of CPR andor defibrillation are 
dependent on the time it takes for an ambulance (equipped with a defi- 
brillator) to arrive at the scene of an emergency. 
As a mechanism for reducing response times, 91 1 systems have several 
advantages. First, they save time in the placement of the telephone call, 
since citizens are unlikely to have memorized the telephone number for 
the relevant agency. Further, the personnel who receive the first telephone 
call are trained to handle emergencies, as opposed to standard telephone 
operators or directory assistance personnel. Even when the appropriate 
agency is reached, decentralized call centers without 91 1 tend to assign 
telephone duties to personnel who also have other responsibilities. Spe- 
cialization might be important for learning the details of a geographical 
area as well  as for developing the skills required to gather information 
from emergency callers. However, there is potentially a cost to centraliza- 
tion in the cases where 911 is provided at a central location without En- 
hanced 911 capabilities, since workers may not be as familiar with ad- 
dresses and geography when they are responsible for larger areas. 
As 91 1 systems have evolved and diffused over the past 30 years, there 
have been several important advancements in the technology utilized to 
implement these systems. One main area for advancement has been the 
development of Enhanced 91 1 systems (E91  l), which utilize caller identi- 
fication together with databases of addresses. To implement this automatic 
location identification feature, counties must first develop a system of ad- 
dressing that provides unique street addresses to every residence (which 
often do not exist in rural areas) and develop a map of the county with all 
of these addresses. This system allows call takers to pinpoint the location 
of a caller almost instantaneously (the databases may include very precise 
information about the location of a telephone in a building or public place, 
and they can also include special information about individual health is- 
sues or disabilities). 
There are a number of benefits to E911 technology. Of course, even 
when the caller knows the location and directions precisely, it takes time 
to communicate this information, and mistakes are easy to make with 
callers who are experiencing panic or fear. For the frequent cases where 
people do not know their exact address (they are visiting a friend or expe- 
rience an emergency incident in a public place), the location information 
is even more valuable. Likewise, the location information can be crucial 120  Susan Athey and Scott Stern 
for callers who are children and for adults who do not speak English or 
are unable to speak. Furthermore, once address information can be com- 
municated instantaneously, the call taker has more time to gather informa- 
tion about the severity of the emergency, and the call taker can further 
provide prearrival instructions to the caller. Finally, this system mitigates 
some of the costs of centralizing the call centers, since detailed geographic 
knowledge of an area is not essential. 
After a call taker receives and establishes the location and severity of 
an emergency call, the dispatcher directs an ambulance to the scene of the 
emergency. The ambulance provides three related services: provision of 
immediate emergency care, transportation service to a hospital, and the 
exercise of (limited) discretion over the allocation of patients to particular 
local hospitals. Counties differ in their provision of ambulance  service^.^ 
A potential benefit of specialized personnel and coordinated 91 1 ser- 
vices is that scarce resources for ambulance services can be more effi- 
ciently all~cated.~  The dispatcher might have to choose whether to dis- 
patch an ambulance equipped with advanced life support (ALS) facilities, 
or, alternatively, a less technically sophisticated basic life support (BLS) 
unit. This decision can be made more efficient when the call taker gathers 
the relevant information about the nature of  the emergency. When such 
decisions are made in the absence of appropriate information, ambulances 
may not be available to answer higher priority calls, and average response 
times for high-priority cases will rise. In fact, a number of studies docu- 
ment the fact that many ambulance systems service a large number of 
superfluous calls, where ambulance service was not the best method for 
providing care (Gibson 1977; Smith 1988; Brown and Sindelar 1993). This 
literature tends to strongly support the increased use of sophisticated prio- 
ritization and computerization  in the dispatching  process. Coordinated and 
trained call takers and dispatchers can better utilize the scarce ambulance 
resources, and the adoption of computer-aided  dispatching and other such 
solutions are more easily accomplished in systems that have E911. 
In addition to the direct effect of the 91  1 system on the productivity of 
the emergency health care system, the emergency response system also 
affects the allocation of patients to hospitals. The ambulance personnel 
are instructed to use a standard protocol for allocating patients to hospi- 
3. However, we  have not collected detailed data about the ambulance services in different 
counties for this paper. 
4. While we focus in the current paper on the choice of technology for a community’s 91 1 
system, there are also important differences among counties in terms of the human resource 
practices employed. In the context of medical emergencies, there has been a diffusion of 
“emergency medical  dispatch”  (EMD) systems that  provide  a  more systematic way  of 
handling particular emergencies. EMD systems enable call takers to provide medical instruc- 
tions over the phone to bystanders (such as instructions for CPR)  to reduce the time until 
key medical procedures are performed (such as CPR)  and to maintain calm at an emergency 
site until ambulance care arrives. The Adoption and Impact of Advanced Emergency Response Services  121 
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Fig. 4.1  County trauma protocol 
tals (see fig.  4.1 for a representative county protocol). In figure 4.1,  pa- 
tients are allocated to hospitals according to a number of  risk criteria, 
with more severe patients being allocated to the “trauma center” (which 
provides a certified level of emergency room services and technology) in 
most cases but to the geographically closest hospital if the nearest trauma 122  Susan Athey and Scott Stern 
center is greater than 30 minutes away from the site of  the emergency. 
While the protocol provides “bright line” rules for most situations, ambu- 
lance personnel are given a limited amount of discretion about borderline 
cases and are also instructed to confirm some discretionary choices with 
“medical command.” Thus, ambulance personnel, using agreed-upon pro- 
tocols and their own judgment, resolve a trade-off between reduced trans- 
port time and allocating the patient to the hospital with the highest level 
of cardiac care facilities. By providing better dispatching, gathering more 
patient information prior to arrival, and shortening response time, higher 
levels of 91 1 service may allow the allocation of patients to hospitals to be 
more efficient. For example, when response time is shorter and dispatchers 
have more precise information about the patient’s location, there will be 
more time to transport a cardiac patient to a hospital with specialized 
facilities. 
The mechanism that allocates patients to hospitals can also have unin- 
tended consequences, in that it affects the incentives of hospitals to adopt 
various technologies. According to the triage protocols, certain patients 
should almost never be allocated to hospitals without a sufficient level 
of emergency services, and cardiac patients may tend to be allocated to 
hospitals known for cardiac care. Thus, hospitals may have a “business- 
stealing” incentive to increase the rating of their emergency room or their 
available technology (Vogt 1997). Anecdotal evidence suggests that hospi- 
tals are aware of the discretion of ambulance operators, although their 
response to this discretion is not always as sophisticated or expensive as 
increased technology adoption. In many localities, hospitals provide free 
supplies to the ambulances, as well as amenities for ambulance operators 
such as access to lounges supplied with food and beverages. 
Empirically, there is wide variation across counties in the provision of 
91 1 services. Some of the heterogeneity may be accounted for by efficiency 
considerations. For example, counties in which addresses are assigned sys- 
tematically see lower benefits to E911. Differences in population may also 
account for differences in adoption across counties, since as a service with 
adoption costs and fixed costs, 91 1 should exhibit economies of scale, at 
least initially (systems that become too large may experience coordination 
costs). Further, the costs of adoption and implementation of 91 1 may vary 
across counties. Consider the nature of these costs. When adopting E911, 
it is necessary to assign new addresses, create new maps, and develop a 
computerized database, a process that is very labor-intensive and usually 
takes at least six months to a year to complete. Furthermore, the tele- 
phone equipment, caller identification database, and system of call-taker 
workstations must be procured and installed. While systematic data about 
the start-up costs of E911 is unavailable, based on several cases, we  esti- 
mate that a typical county has a start-up cost of between $1 million and 
$4 million. The Adoption and Impact of Advanced Emergency Response Services  123 
Local Fee (28 
56% 
State Fee (7 States) 
m 
State 8. Local Fee 
(6 States)  ?  12% 
(2 States) 
4% 






Telco Trade  8% 
(1 State) 
2% 
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Source: Adapted from Pivetta (1995, 135). 
For example, consider Berks County, Pennsylvania, whose 1990 popula- 
tion was 336,000. Berks County reports that the capital start-up costs of 
its E911 system were approximately $3 million, while annual operating 
costs were over $2.3 milli~n.~  Its budget comes primarily from a tax on 
telephone lines ($0.97 per line each month) as authorized by state legisla- 
tion. (Fig. 4.2 shows the national distribution of funding sources for 91 1 
systems.) The Berks County 911 program employs nine call takers, two 
administrators, a programmer for its computer-aided dispatching soft- 
ware, and an administrative assistant. 
In addition to capital costs, there are other factors that affect the adop- 
tion of 91 1 systems; we explored these motivations in informal interviews 
of administrators and regulators in several states. We found that in smaller 
counties, early adoption of E911 was often the result of the actions of a 
highly self-motivated and informed government employee. Because many 
different public and private agencies are involved in the implementation 
process (the post office, utility companies, and telephone companies), po- 
litical factors and bureaucratic barriers may slow adoption. While in large 
counties there may be personnel assigned exclusively to this task, smaller 
counties tend to assign the same personnel to many different tasks, and 
the incentives as well  as information required to organize an effort for 
5. This number does not include overhead incurred by the Berks County Communication 
Center, which handles many calls in addition to 91 1 calls. For further information, see http:// 
www. readingpa.cod9  1 11. 124  Susan Athey and Scott Stern 
adoption may be lacking. The adoption of a centralized 91 1 system may 
lead small, local police departments, as well  as private ambulance dis- 
patching services, to lose employment as well  as local autonomy; these 
agencies may be able to block adoption. Finally, as a publicly provided 
service, public demand for the system will  also play a role, where this 
demand depends not only on factors such as income but also on the politi- 
cal views of the citizens about government services. 
4.3  TheData 
As mentioned earlier, little previous empirical research has been done 
on the prehospital emergency system. Thus, in this paper we  choose to 
conduct our analysis at several different levels of aggregation: individual, 
hospital, and county. Each of these sources of data allow us to address 
different questions about the adoption and productivity of elements of the 
emergency system. Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 provide definitions, sources, 
and means and standard deviations for all variables. 
4.3.1  County-Level Variables 
For the purposes of this paper, we  characterize the prehospital emer- 
gency infrastructure and its determinants at the county level. Unfortu- 
nately, we  are not aware of  a comprehensive accounting of 91 1 practices 
in the United States. Within Pennsylvania, we gathered information about 
9 1  1 provision through publicly available sources and telephone interviews. 
At the national level, we made use of a survey administered in 1995 by the 
National Emergency Number Association (NENA), a national advocacy 
organization for 911 systems. As a result, our national sample of coun- 
ties is limited to 772 counties who completed the NENA survey and who 
provided answers that allowed us to characterize the 91 1 system at the 
county 
For each county, we organize our analysis around a three-tier character- 
ization of the 91 1 system: whether there is a 91 1 system at all (NO 91 1) 
and whether it is a basic 91 1 (BASIC 91 1) or enhanced (ENHANCED 
911) system. In the national sample, 75 percent of these counties have 
adopted the highest level of service (ENHANCED 91 l), illustrating that 
E911 has been diffused substantially (91 1-LEVEL is simply a variable that 
is 0, 1, or 2, depending on whether the system is NO 91 1, BASIC 91 1, or 
ENHANCED 91 1). However, the selection of counties who responded to 
NENA's  survey is biased toward systems with higher levels of 91 1 service, 
6. A large number of responses in fact reflected the technology and training choices of 
smaller 91 1 systems (e.g.,  townships  or even university campuses). We  selected out only those 
observations  who reported that they were the PRIMARY PSAP center and who stated that 
their coverage was countywide. This selection process underrepresents counties for which 
there is no countywide 91 1 system. Table 4.1  Variables and Delinitions 






91 I  level 
NO 911 
BASIC 91 1 
ENHANCED 91 1 















URGENT CARE CENTER 
CATH IAB 
OPENHEART FAC 
TRAUMA cm  LEVEL 
Dummy variable = 1 if spell 
Time (mins) from dispatch to arrival 
Time (mins) of EMS unit at scene 
Time (mins) from scene to hospital 
outcome = dead 
at scene 
No countywide 91 1 emergency response 
Countywide 91 1; no automatic location 
Countywide 91 1 with ALI 
No 91 1 = 0; Basic 91 1 = 1; Enhanced 
identification (ALI) 
911 = 2 
Dummy = 1 if sex = male 
Patient age (years) 
Dummy = 1 if EMS unit records 
Dummy = 1 if patient receives 
cardiac arrest incident 
defibrillation prior to arrival at 
hospital 
Glasgow trauma score dummies (1  5 = 
Least Severe; 3 = Most Severe) 
Glasgow score = 0 (Unknown or 
Unrecorded) 
Dummy = 1 if insurance status = 
Dummy = 1 if insurance status = 
Dummy = 1 if insurance status = 
Dummy = 1 if insurance status = 
Dummy = 1 if insurance status = other 
Medicare 
Medicaid 
private or government 
self-pay 
Dummy = 1 if certified urgent care 
Dummy = 1 if cardiac catheterization 
Dummy = 1 if  open heart surgery 




= 2 if emergency room 
= 3 if trauma facilities present 
= 4 if certified county trauma 
hospital 




NENA; telephone survey 
NENA; telephone survey 
NENA, telephone survey 
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Table 4.1  (continued) 




Total no. of emergency room visits 
No. of full-time doctors on staff in 
No. of medical residents on staff in 
VOLUME  in 1995 (in thousands) 
hospital 
hospital 
County hospital infrastructure 
CERTIFIED TRAUM  CNTR  Dummy = 1 if county contains at least 
one hospital with TRAUMA  CNTR 
LEVEL = 4 
No. of hospitals in county/No. of 
square miles 
No. of recorded cardiac incidents in 
HOSP PER  SQ.  MILE 
COUNTY CARDIAC 










%a  PEROT 
(reference year = 1992) 
County populationl1,OOO 
Populatiodcounty square miles 
County-level income per capita/l,000 
Crime rate (incidents per 100,000 pop.) 
Violent crime rate (incidents per 
1992 level of police expenditures 
1992 level of public health expenditures 
1992 Republican voter percentage 





9 1 1  -TRAIN-LAW  Legislation implemented for 91 1 
Telecommunicator training 
requirements 
Legislation approved but not 
implemented for 91 1 
Telecommunicator training 
requirements 


















Note: The natural logarithm of a variable will be denoted L VARIABLE NAME. 
especially undercounting  counties with  no  countywide 91 1 system; in 
Pennsylvania, where we have a comprehensive accounting of the counties, 
30 of the 54 counties had E911 at the start of  1995 (see fig. 4.3). 
In addition to the county-level variables, we  include in our analysis 
two “91 1” variables drawn from NENA state-level surveys that indicate 
whether there is implemented legislation guiding the administration of 91 1 
systems (in particular, governing training policies for workers using the 
systems) (91 1-TRAIN-LAW)  or whether legislation has been passed but 
not yet implemented (9 1  LTRAIN-PLAN).  These variables are intended The Adoption and Impact of Advanced Emergency Response Services  127 
Table 4.2  Summary Statistics  (couoty-level averages) 
Pennsylvania Sample  National Sample 
Standard  Standard 
Mean  Deviation  Mean  Deviation 
NO. OF COUNTY/SYSTEMS 
91 1 level 
NO 911 
BASIC 91 1 
ENHANCED 91 1 
County hospital infrastructure 
CERTIFlED COUNTY 
TRAUMA CENTER 






INCOME PER CAP 
VCRIMER4TE (CRIME RATE 



















13.741  6 
39.0000 
22.1622 















































“Out of 54 Pennsylvania counties for which we observe the 91 1 level, 4 experienced midyear changes, 
yielding 58 “county system” observations. 
to be proxies for the level of administrative information and assistance 
provided by the state. 
We further gathered a variety of demographic, political, and economic 
data at the county level. In addition to a number of familiar demographic 
characteristics (POPULATION, DENSITY,  INCOME  PER  CAPITA, 
CRIMERATE, POLICE EXP, HEALTH EXP, each drawn from the City 
and County DataBook or the Census of  Governments), we also characterize 
the political climate of a community by the presidential voting shares from 
the  1992 election. This election is especially interesting because of the 
strong showing of Perot, allowing a somewhat more nuanced measure of 
a county’s political demand for public expenditures (Perot voters were 
noted for their strong beliefs in limited government). 
4.3.2  Hospital-Level Variables 
Our information about hospitals is obtained from the American Hospi- 
tal Association (AHA) annual hospital inventory survey. We use this infor- 128  Susan Athey and  Scott Stern 
Table 4.3  Patient-Level Summary  Statistics (Pennsylvania sample only) 
Standard 
Mean  Deviation 
NO.  OF COUNTIES  54.0000 
NO. OF PATIENT OBS  24,664.0000 
Outcome measures 
DEAD  0.071 1 
TIMETO-SCENE  9.1251 
TIME-AT-SCENE  15.9059 
TIME-TO-HOSP  13.2354 
91  I  level 
NO 911  0.0827 
BASIC 91 1  0.1397 
ENHANCED 91 1  0.7777 
Patient characteristics 
MALE  0.4799 
AGE  69.8678 
CARDIAC ARREST  0.1043 
DEFIBRILLATE  0.3999 
Glasgow trauma score (15 = least severe: 3 = most severe; 0  = unknown) 
GLASGOW SCORE (EXCLUDING  GLASGOW = 0)  14.2011 
GLASGOW 0  0.0442 
Insurance status 
MEDICARE  0.6627 
MEDICAID  0.0516 
PRIVATE  0.1885 
SELF PAY  0.0115 
OTHER  0.0358 
Hospital characteristics (based on patient allocation) 
URGENT CARE CENTER  0.2172 
CATH LAB  0.6703 
OPENHEART PAC  0.2940 
TRAUMA CNTR LEVEL  3.1670 
HOSPITAL DOCTORS  13.7234 
HOSPITAL RESIDENTS  27.2592 


























mation to provide information at three different levels of analysis. First, 
when we study the incentives of hospitals to adopt technology, we consider 
the availability of  hospital technology at any hospital within a county. 
For example, CERTIFIED TRAUM CNTR represents the presence of 
a certified trauma center in a given county, while HOSP PER SQ. MILE 
represents the density of  hospitals. We  also consider the number of  re- 
corded  cardiac  incidents  that  required  ambulance  service  in  1995 
(COUNTY CARDIAC PATIENTS). Second, in our patient-level produc- 
tivity analysis, we  link hospital characteristics to our patient-level data- The Adoption and Impact of Advanced Emergency Response Services  129 
Delaware 
None  Changed mid-year 
Basic  0  Unknown 
=  Enhanced 
Fig. 4.3  Distribution of emergency response systems, by county 
base in order to control for hospital quality as well as to analyze the allo- 
cation process that assigns patients to hospitals. Third, we  consider the 
hospital as the unit of analysis when we consider how technology invest- 
ments interact with the share of  cardiac patients who  are treated in a 
given hospital. 
For each hospital, we consider three main types of variables. First, we 
characterize the generic emergency infrastructure for a given hospital by 
identifying whether the hospital is an urgent care provider (URGENT) 
and by identifying the level of certified emergency care (TRAUMA CNTR 
LEVEL). In our analysis of individual data, we  examine the case of car- 
diac care and we  also look specifically at the cardiac care facilities pro- 
vided by each hospital. In particular, we observe whether a hospital has a 
cardiac catheterization lab (CATHETER) and whether it has open heart 
surgery capability (OPENHEART).  Finally, we  characterize the overall 
features  of  each  hospital,  including  its  size  (EMERGENCY  ROOM 
VOLUME;  HOSPITAL  DOCTORS)  and  the  number  of  residents 
(HOSPITAL RESIDENTS). 
4.3.3  Patient-Level Variables 
Our patient-level variables are drawn from a database of every ambu- 
lance ride in Pennsylvania that could be  linked to a hospital discharge 130  Susan Athev and  Scott Stern 
during 1995 (approximately 170,000 observations). This data set is gath- 
ered by  the Pennsylvania Department of  Health and has only recently 
been made available to a limited number of researchers; we are not aware 
of prior work on this database (or on a similar ambulance-level database) 
by health care economists. 
The information provided in this patient-level data is unusually rich. 
First, there are several indicators associated with the responsiveness of 
the 911 system. We  analyze three different measures of the timeliness of 
ambulance response: the amount of time it takes to get to the scene of an 
emergency (TIME-TO-SCENE),  the amount of time spent at the scene 
(TIME-AT-SCENE),  and the amount of time elapsed from when the am- 
bulance leaves the scene to the time when the ambulance arrives at the 
hospital (TIME-TO-HOSP), 
In the next sections, we  will examine how the response time measures 
vary with other features of  the medical care system. To better motivate 
that type of analysis, we restrict our analysis of the Pennsylvania data to 
the case of cardiac incidents. One of the main advantages of analyzing the 
case of cardiac incidents is that, in contrast to many data sets, there are in 
fact a number of quite precise indicators of the level of severity of each 
patient. In particular, each patient is assigned a Glasgow score, which is a 
number between 0 and 15 that indicates the severity of the heart attack 
(lower numbers imply higher severity, with 3 being the worst and 0 indicat- 
ing “unknown” or “missing7’).  While the bulk of observations are coded 
with the weakest severity (GLASGOW = 15), there exists a substantial 
minority for which there is variation in the data. We are also able to ob- 
serve whether the incident is believed to be a cardiac arrest or simply a 
cardiac incident (CARD-ARR  = 1 or 0). 
In addition to these measures of severity, the data includes relatively 
detailed information about each individual in the data set, including in- 
surance status, age, and sex. We also observe some information about the 
types of procedures administered by the emergency response paramedics, 
including whether the patient received defibrillation  treatment prior to ar- 
rival at the hospital. However, since the decision to defibrillate a patient 
is conditioned on patient characteristics that are unobserved to the econo- 
metrician, this variable serves mainly as a control in our analysis. 
Finally, we are able to observe some concrete measures associated with 
patient outcomes. In our main analysis, we will focus on the most extreme 
of these measures, DEAD: whether or not the patient dies from the inci- 
dent, either in the emergency room or in the hospital afterward. 
4.4  The Determinants of the 911 System Adoption 
Table 4.4 summarizes the characteristics of three groups of counties in 
Pennsylvania: those with no 91 1, Basic 91 1, and Enhanced 911. Because The Adoption and Impact of Advanced Emergency Response Services  131 
Table 4.4  County Characteristics by 911 Level (means  of county-level averages) 
County 9 11 Level 
Enhanced 91 1 
(Excluding 4 
No  Basic  Enhanced  Largest 
91 1  91 1  911  Counties) 
NO. OF COUNTIES  1  1 .0000  16.0000  31.oooO  27.0000 
NO. OF CARDIAC OBS  2,039.oooO  3,445.0000  19,180.0000  10,993.0000 
Outcome measures 
DEAD  0.0567  0.0565  0.0680  0.0671 
TIME-TO-SCENE  11.7469  11.2579  9.8656  10.1360 
TIME-AT-SCENE  12.8364  14.3900  15.7645  15.5155 
TIME-TO-HOSP  16.6352  15.2248  13.7586  14.2163 
County hospital infrastructure 
CERTIFIED TRAUM CNTR  0.0000  0.1875  0.3871  0.2963 
HOSP PER  SQ.  MILE  0.0032  0.0024  0.01 11  O.Oo40 
PATIENTS  255.2500  267.3300  671.3667  421.8017 
COUNTY CARDIAC 
Demographics 
POPULATION  109.0007  106.6353  283.2884  172.4249 
DENSITY  0.1756  0.1405  0.8164  0.2807 
INCOME PER CAP  11.2406  11.6869  13.0380  12.5100 
CRIMERATE  0.0018  0.0018  0.0026  0.0020 
POLICE BXP  4.2037  4.3714  26.5468  7.9701 
HEALTH EXP  2.3600  3.5011  23.0656  8.4571 
yo  REPUBLICAN  39.9091  41.6875  37.2903  38.0741 
yo  PEROT  23.6667  22.5455  21.7826  22.5500 
four counties are significantly larger, more dense, and have more hospitals 
than the others, we also report the counties with E911 excluding the four 
largest counties (we will also report specifications that exclude these four 
counties in our subsequent regression analysis). There are some systematic 
differences between the demographic characteristics of the counties that 
have made different adoption decisions about 911. The largest and most 
densely populated counties, as well as those with the highest income and 
largest police and health budgets, tend to have adopted Enhanced 91 1. 
When comparing the counties with no 911 to the counties with Basic 
911, it is interesting to note that they are remarkably similar in terms of 
density, crime, income, and hospitals per mile. Figure 4.3 illustrates that 
many contiguous counties with similar geographic features have different 
levels of 911. The main differences are that the counties with Basic 911 
have  higher populations, higher  expenditures, and more  Perot voters. 
Since 91 1 systems involve fixed costs, the differences in adoption appear 
to be consistent with efficiency motivations on the part of  the counties. 
However, since the county boundaries are purely political distinctions, this 132  Susan  Athey and Scott Stern 
finding raises the question of whether between-county cooperation in the 
provision of 91 1 services might allow more citizens to be served by  91 1. 
The state of Vermont recently implemented a statewide 91 1 system, per- 
haps recognizing the economies of  scale associated the provision of the 
service at the state level. 
As described in section 4.2, we  expect that the level of 91 1 technology 
will respond to political demand as well as demographic factors related to 
the efficiency of the service in a particular locality. While much of our 
productivity analysis will focus on a subset of cardiac patients in Pennsyl- 
vania, a within-state analysis can provide only limited insight as to the 
factors that determine the allocation of 91 1 services (and their productiv- 
ity benefits) to different subsets of the population. Thus, in table 4.5, we 
consider the determinants of adoption of the level of 91 1 service in a na- 
tional cross-section of counties. As expected, POPULATION is signifi- 
cantly correlated with adoption; politically, counties with a relatively high 
proportion of Perot voters tend to adopt lower levels of 91 1, consistent 
with the emphasis of the Perot movement on limited government expendi- 
ture. Also, counties in states with regulations about training had higher 
levels of 91 1 adoption. This legislation either requires or recommends 
standardized training programs in  association with 91 1 programs, and 
may  further proxy for the institutional support for 911 provided by  the 
state boards that oversee 91 1 centers. We  interpret this result to indicate 
that states that provide legislative support and guidance for 91 1 systems 
have a higher propensity to adopt 911 services. Thus, we  conclude that 
91 1 adoption responds to efficiency motivations as well as to political and 
regulatory factors that may be unrelated to efficiency. 
The latter two specifications in table 4.5 include a variable that measures 
the highest level of in-hospital emergency care offered in the county (in 
addition to the controls described above). Even though the unconditional 
correlation between 91 1 and the level of in-hospital emergency care is pos- 
itive (.19) and significantly different from zero, most of that positive rela- 
tionship is accounted for by common factors that affect the adoption of 
both (e.g.,  population). Thus, despite the potential for strategic comple- 
mentarities between hospital technology adoption and 91 1 services when 
higher levels of 91 1 better allocate patients to high-technology hospitals, 
we do not see strong evidence of this interaction in our national sample. 
4.5  The Impact of 911 Systems and Hospital Choice on Ambulance 
Response Times and Mortality: The Case of Cardiac Arrest 
We now turn to an analysis of individual cardiac incidents. We evaluate 
the effects of the 911 infrastructure on patient outcomes, as well  as on 
several “intermediate inputs” to patient outcomes, in particular, several 
components of response time. We focus on intermediate inputs for several The Adoption and Impact of Advanced Emergency Response Services  133 
Table 4.5  911 Demand Regressions (national sample) 
Dependent Variable = 91 1 Level 
Base  Include  Include 
Base  Regression  County  Hospital 
Regression  (Ordered  Hospital  Infrastructure 
(OW  Logit)  Infrastructure  (Ordered Logit) 
County hospital infrastructure 
CERT.  TRAUMA CNTR. 
County demographic characteristics 
L POPULATION  0.1 1172 
(0.02972) 
DENSITY  0.000004 
(0.000037) 
INCOME PER CAP  0.01207 
(0.00956) 
CRIMERATE  0.27501 
(1.14780) 
POLICE EXP  -0.00108 
(0.00081) 
HEALTH EXP  0.00088 
(0.00243) 
County  political characteristics 
yo  REPUBLICAN  -0.00332 
(0.00284) 
(0.00402) 
% PEROT  -0.00854 
State legislation 
9 1 1-TRAIN-LAW 
Constant 






















































































reasons. First, since 91 1 provides service benefits through an investment 
in information technology, we  are inherently interested in disentangling 
the extent to which 91 1 provides services that are more timely and better 
respond to patient characteristics. Second, mortality is a very noisy mea- 
sure of the productivity of the emergency response system, and even in 
our large data set, we  see only a few thousand deaths from cardiac inci- 
dents, and only a few hundred in the counties without E911  systems. 134  Susan Athey and Scott Stern 
Third, even in these cases, we expect that the policy variables will have a 
significant impact on outcomes in only a small subset of the cases. Many 
of the patients who die would die regardless of the response time; and 
many patients who survive did not rely heavily on the emergency response 
system. However, if we  establish that 91  1 reduces response time, we  can 
rely on a number of clinical studies that provide direct evidence about the 
benefits of faster response times for mortality. 
Building on our analysis from section 4.2, we predict that the first com- 
ponent  of  response  time, TIME-TO-SCENE,  should be  lower when 
counties are able to gather address and location information more rapidly 
and precisely, and when ambulance resources are allocated efficiently (re- 
call cardiac emergencies are high-priority events). The second component, 
called TIME-AT-SCENE,  should be longer when more treatment is given 
prior to moving a patient; it should also be longer when patients are lo- 
cated in high-rise buildings or large complexes. The final component, 
TIME-TO-HOSP,  should be lower when dispatchers are able to provide 
better assistance to ambulance drivers in terms of routing and directions 
to hospitals from varied locations. On the other hand, TIME-TO-HOSP 
should reflect a trade-off between the benefits of arriving at a high-quality 
hospital and the benefits of receiving hospital attention as soon as pos- 
sible. The impact of 911 on this trade-off might be to encourage ambu- 
lances to take somewhat longer rides, if time has been saved in other parts 
of the process. 
Of  course, both TIME-TO-SCENE  and TIME-TO-HOSP  will  de- 
pend on the location of a given patient relative to the hospitals, and varia- 
tion across counties in the average proximity of patients to hospitals is a 
potential source of unobserved heterogeneity that must be considered in 
interpreting our results. We  partially alleviate this problem in several of 
our specifications by  including controls for TIME-TO-HOSP  in the re- 
gressions concerning TIME-TO-SCENE,  and vice versa. For example, 
in the analysis of the determinants of TIME-TO-SCENE,  the variable 
TIME-TO-HOSP  acts as a control for the remoteness of the patient’s lo- 
cation. 
Table 4.6 reports the means of patient-level variables according to the 
level of 91 1 provided in a given county. Only 2,039 of the 24,664 cardiac 
incidents occurred in counties without 91 1. The mortality rates are very 
similar in counties with no 911 or Basic 911: Approximately 6.5 percent 
of cardiac emergencies result in death. In contrast, even excluding the 
largest four counties, the average mortality rate in counties with E911 is 
7 percent (see fig. 4.4 for the distribution of county mortality rates). We 
further see that counties with higher levels of  911 have  lower  average 
TIME-TO-SCENE  and  TIME-TO-HOSP,  while  they  have  longer 
TIME-AT-SCENE.  We will explore all of these relationships in more de- 
tail in our regression analysis. 
The patient characteristics,  trauma scores, and insurance status variables Table 4.6  Distribution of Pennsylvania 91 1 Level (patient-level averages) 
County 91 1 Level 
Enhanced 9 1  1 
(Excluding 4 
No  Basic  Enhanced  Largest 
911  91 1  91 1  Counties) 
NO.  OF COUNTIES  1  1 .oOOo  16.0000  3  1  .OOOO 
NO.  OF CARDIAC OBS  2,039.0000  3,445.0000  19,180.0000 
Outcome measures 
DEAD  0.0652  0.0668  0.0726 
TIME-TO-SCENE  10.8759  10.1756  8.7503 
TIME-AT-SCENE  13.9897  14.2517  16.4068 
TIME-TO-HOSP  15.8141  15.5509  12.5453 
Patient characteristics 
MALE  0.4723  0.5013  0.4757 
AGE  70.0844  70.0673  69.8090 
CARDIAC ARREST  0.0510  0.0456  0.1205 
DEFIBRILLATE  0.531 1  0.3358  0.3974 
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I 
I  I  I 
0  .05  .1  .15 
(mean1  dead 
Fig. 4.4  County-level mortality distribution 
have almost identical means across the no 91 1, Basic 91 1, and Enhanced 
91 1 categories, with a few exceptions. First, the Glasgow score variables 
have different means in Enhanced 911 counties. Further, a much larger 
percentage of patients reported cardiac arrest in the Enhanced 91 1 group. 
Finally, many more patients reported defibrillation (before reaching the 
hospital) in the no 91 1 counties. This might be due to differences  in scoring 
or poor recordkeeping in a few counties; it could also reflect real differ- 
ences in the composition and treatment of emergencies, or differences in 
the availability of defibrillators in ambulances. 
It is also worth noting the large differences between patients in no 91 1 
counties and other counties in the level of  technology possessed by  the 
hospital that receives the patients. None of the no 91 1 patients received 
treatment in a certified trauma center, and only a quarter went to hospitals 
with cardiac catheterization laboratories. Likewise, the emergency room 
volume and size of hospitals is much lower in no 91 1 counties. There are 
also significant differences between Basic and Enhanced 91 1 counties in 
the provision of hospital care, but these differences are not as dramatic 
once the four largest counties are excluded. 
Now consider the effects of 9 1  1 technology on the various components 
of response time, beginning with the time elapsed between the dispatch of 
a 911 call and the arrival at the emergency (TIME-TO-SCENE)  (table 
4.7). There are four specifications, which include a number of patient-level 
as well as county-level covariates (the results in tables 4.7-4.9  about the 
effects of patient-level characteristics are generally robust to specifications 
that include county fixed effects instead of  county-level covariates). The Table 4.7  Time-to-Scene Equation 
Dependent Variable = L TIME-TO-SCENE 
Excluding  Only Counties 
4 Largest  with 91 1 
Base Regression  Time Controls  Counties  Level Changes 
(OW  (OW  (OW  (Fixed Effects) 
~ 
Time controls 
L TIME-AT-SCENE  -0.13 163 
(0.00654) 
L TIME-TO-HOSP  0.32575 
(0.00507) 
91  I  level 
NO 911  0.09383  0.01831 
BASIC 91 1  0.07538  0.0222 
Patient characteristics 
MALE  0.03631  0.01558 
(0,0083)  (0.00759) 
AGE  0.00745  0.00398 
(0.00205)  (0.00188) 
AGE-SQUARED  -0.00006  -0.00002 
(0.00002)  (0.00001) 
CARDIAC ARREST  -0.12503  -0.06098 
(0.01698)  (0.01557) 
(0.01341)  (0.01  228) 
(0.01787)  (0.01635) 
DEFIBRILLATE  0.03474  0.02764 
(0.00846)  (0.00773) 
Glasgow trauma score  (15 = least severe; 3 = most severe; 0 = unknown) 
GLASGOW 0  1.60486  1.33791 
(0.201  63)  (0.18496) 
GLASGOW 3  1.63347  1.41933 
(0.20315)  (0.18649) 
GLASGOW 4-9  1.6558  1.4468 
(0.20322)  (0.18644) 
GLASGOW 10-12  1.70663  1.43213 
(0.20283)  (0,18607) 
GLASGOW 13-14  1.6681  1.39132 
(0.20118)  (0.18456) 
GLASGOW 15  1.6887  1.38023 
(0.20057)  (0,18403) 
Insurance status (excluded category = Medicare) 
MEDICAID  -0.08647  -0.0497 
(0.02068)  (0.0189) 
(0.01306)  (0.01 193) 
(0.03815)  (0.03484) 
PRIVATE  -0.001 13  -0.01811 







































































-0.27909 Table 4.7  (continued) 
Dependent Variable = L TIMETO-SCENE 
Excluding  Only Counties 
Base  Time  4 Largest  with 91 1 
Regression  Controls  Counties  Level Changes 
(OW  WS)  (OLS)  (Fixed Effects) 
OTHER 
County hospital infrastructure 
CERT.  TRAUM CNTR 
L HOSP PER  SQ.  MILE 




L INCOME PER  CAP 
VCRIMERATE 
L POLICE EXP 
L HEALTH EXP 
Hospital characteristics 
URGENT CARE CENTER 
CATH IAB 
OPENHEART FAC 
TRAUMA CNTR LEVEL 
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base regression includes 91 1 dummies, patient-level variables, county-level 
demographics, and hospital infrastructure variables, as well as characteris- 
tics of the receiving hospital. Since the hospital allocation is conditioned 
on patient severity, it is difficult to interpret the coefficients for characteris- 
tics of the receiving hospitals. One interpretation is that they are simply 
controls for the patient’s county and severity. 
The next  specification includes controls for TIME-AT-SCENE  and 
TIME-TO-HOSP.  The TIME-TO-HOSP  variable can be thought of as 
a control for the distance from the patient to the hospital, although we 
show later that the hospital  allocation (and thus expected travel time) 
are  conditioned  on  the  patient’s  severity.  The  TIME-AT-SCENE  is 
more difficult to interpret. It might represent the extra time required to 
administer treatments  that  are only  available on  some ambulances, in 
which case longer TIME-AT-SCENE  should be associated with longer 
TIME-TO-SCENE,  since we  expect a longer wait for the scarce resource 
of a better ambulance. It might also represent some features of  the pa- 
tient’s location, such as the presence of elevators or stairs in  a high-rise 
building. High-rises might be located closer to hospitals. However, when 
the largest counties are excluded, there are probably fewer high-rises in 
the data set. 
The last specification considers only counties who changed their 91 1 
system during the year. Since a fixed effect is included for each county, the 
coefficients on the 911 dummies can be interpreted as differences in the 
mean response time as a result of the change. Of course, all time-invariant 
variables are dropped from this regression, and in addition, several other 
control variables were dropped due to the small number of observations. 
Since an alternative explanation for any findings in the first three specifica- 
tions is that unobserved differences in counties drive the results, our find- 
ings for within-county changes are particularly interesting despite the lim- 
ited size of the data set that considers such changes. 
Consider  now  the  results  of  our  analysis.  The  first  result  is  that 
TIME-TO-SCENE  is  lower in counties with no 911 or Basic 911  than 
counties with E911. In the base specification, counties with no 911 are 
about 10 percent slower than counties with E911, while counties with Ba- 
sic are approximately 8 percent slower than counties with E911. The mag- 
nitudes vary somewhat in different specifications,  and the result for no 91 1 
is not always significantly different from zero. Nonetheless, the signs of 
the coefficients are robust to a variety of specifications. When interpreting 
these results, it is of course important to observe the caveat that results 
may  be driven by  unobserved differences between counties, such as the 
distribution of residences relative to hospitals. However, as shown earlier 
in figure 4.3, many adjacent counties in similar geographical areas have 
different 911 systems, and further, when the four largest counties are ex- 
cluded, the counties are fairly comparable in terms of demographics. Of 140  Susan Athey and Scott Stern 
course, controls are included for several important demographic variables 
as well as the number of hospitals per mile in the county (which decreases 
response time, as expected). 
In order to provide further evidence about the robustness of the results, 
we  consider  the  final  specification, which  includes only  counties  that 
changed during the year. The county that  changed from Basic to En- 
hanced 91 1 saw a 14 percent decrease in its TIME-TO-SCENE,  while the 
counties that changed from no 911 to Basic saw  a decrease that is  not 
statistically significant. The weaker results about changes from no 91 1 to 
Basic 91 1 may  reflect the fact that moving to a centralized 91 1 system 
without automated address-finding technology may  have ambiguous re- 
sults, especially in the short run. At a minimum, the system may require 
some learning-by-doing before call takers in a new 91 1 system are able to 
gather correct address information for a large area. 
We also find that the emergency response system appears to respond to 
the severity of  the patient’s symptoms: patients with a higher Glasgow 
score have somewhat higher TIME-TO-SCENE,  although this result is 
not  statistically significant. We  do not, however, see  differences in the 
TIME-TO-SCENE  for different categories of insurance (Medicare is the 
comparison group) or for different ages, with the exceptions that Medicaid 
patients and younger patients tend to have faster response times. 
County-level  demographics  are  also  correlated  with  TIME-TO- 
SCENE. When the largest counties are included, counties with large popu- 
lations and high densities have faster response times; once the large count- 
ies  are excluded, the results are reversed. In all cases, higher income is 
associated with faster response times. 
Table 4.8 analyzes the determinants of TIME-AT-SCENE,  following 
the same set of specifications as in table 4.7. TIME-AT-SCENE  is nega- 
tively related to both TIME-TO-SCENE  and TIME-TO-HOSP.  It is in- 
creasing in  the level  of  911, and it is  longer for more severe patients. 
TIME-AT-SCENE  is also longer for highly populated counties and espe- 
cially in those with high crime rates, while it is lower in densely populated, 
high-income, and high-expenditure counties. A full interpretation of these 
results would require further investigation into the services provided by 
ambulances and how they vary with TIME-AT-SCENE.  For example, if 
longer TIME-AT-SCENE  is positively correlated with more services, we 
can interpret the results as saying that more ambulance services are pro- 
vided in counties with higher levels of 911. This interpretation seems in- 
consistent with the results on income and expenditures, however. 
Table 4.9 considers the determinants of TIME-TO-HOSP.  Again, the 
specifications parallel tables 4.7 and 4.8. We  find that, in all specifica- 
tions, counties with higher levels of 91 1 have shorter TIME-TO-HOSP. 
Again, this result holds controlling for demographic factors as well  as 
for the number of hospitals per mile (which decreases TIME-TO-HOSP Table 4.8  Time-at-Scene Equation 
Dependent Variable = L TIME-AT-SCENE 
Excluding  Only Counties 
4 Largest  with 91 1  Base  Time 
Regression  Controls  Counties  Level Changes 
(OW  (OW  (OW  (Fixed Effects) 
Time controls 
L  TIME-TO-SCENE  -0.12301  -0.1574 
L TIME-TO-HOSP  -0.04943  -0.05542 
(0.0061 1)  (0.00777) 
(0.00529)  (0.00669) 
911 level 
NO 911  -0,18644  -0.16716  -0.1 8038 
(0.01  522)  (0.01  501)  (0.01665) 
(0.01  202)  (0.01 186)  (0.01271) 
BASIC 91 1  -0.09558  -0.08014  -0.07043 
Patient characteristics 
MALE  -0.03912  -0.03228  -0.03712 
(0.00744)  (0.00733)  (0.00932) 
AGE  0.00536  0.00691  0.00397 
(0.00184)  (0.00181)  (0.00254) 
AGE-SQUARED  -0.0000  1  -0.00003  -0.00001 
(0.00001)  (0.00001)  (0.00002) 
CARDIAC ARREST  0.02266  -0.00199  0.06571 
(0.01602)  (0.01581)  (0.0359) 
DEFIBRILLATE  0.03347  0.03949  0.0247 
(0.00758)  (0.00747)  (0.00959) 
Glasgow trauma score  (15 = least severe; 3 = most severe; 0 = unknown) 
GLASGOW 0  2.17322  2.45456  2.54128 
(0.1807)  (0.1783)  (0.22585) 
GLASGOW 3  2.45973  2.74229  2.75759 
(0.18206)  (0.17964)  (0.22742) 
GLASGOW 4-9  2.30703  2.58851  2.60049 
(0.18212)  (0.1797)  (0.22805) 
GLASGOW 10-12  2.20594  2.5016  2.55148 
(0.18177)  (0.17938)  (0.22728) 
GLASGOW 13-14  2.19037  2.48 132  2.54956 
(0.18029)  (0.17792)  (0.2255) 
GLASGOW 15  2.17405  2.47202  2.51962 
(0.17975)  (0.17741)  (0.22466) 
Insurance status (excluded category = Medicare) 
MEDICAID  0.00908  -0.00695  0,00054 
(0.01  854)  (0.01827)  (0.02357) 
(0.01171)  (0.01 153)  (0.01489) 
(0.0341  9)  (0.03368)  (0.03861) 
PRIVATE  -0.02495  -0.023  -0.0457 



































(continued) Table 4.8  (continued) 
Dependent Variable = L TIME-AT-SCENE 
Excluding  Only Counties 
Base  Time  4 Largest  with 91 1 
Regression  Controls  Counties  Level Changes 
(OW  (OW  (OW  (Fixed Effects) 
OTHER 
County hospital infrastructure 
CERT. TRAUM CENTER 
L HOSP PER  SQ. MILE 





L INCOME PER  CAP 
VCRIMERATE 
L POLICE EXP 
L HEALTH EXP 
Hospital characteristics 
URGENT CARE CENTER 
CATH LAB 
OPENHEART FAC 





























































































































Observations  24,664.0000 
R-squared  0.7040 Table 4.9  Time-to-Hospital Equation 
Dependent Variable = L TIME-TO-HOSPITAL 
~~~ 
Excluding  Only Counties 
Base  Time  4 Largest  with 91 1 
Regression  Controls  Counties  Level Changes 
(OW  (OLS)  (OW  (Fixed Effects) 
Time controls 
L TIME-TO-SCENE  0.44086  0.47724 
(0.00686)  (0.00837) 
(0.00765)  (0.00906) 
L TIME-AT-SCENE  -0.07159  -0.07504 
91  I  level 
~0911  0.15649  0.10178  0.10605 
(0.01963)  (0.0181)  (0.01943) 
BASIC 91 1  0.12466  0.08459  0.08718 
(0.01551)  (0.0 1427)  (0.01479) 
Patient characteristics 
MALE  0.04784  0.02903  0.02066 
(0.00959)  (0.00882)  (0.01085) 
AGE  0.01282  0.00992  0.00874 
(0.00237)  (0.0021  8)  (0.00295) 
AGE-SQUARED  -0.0001 1  -0.00009  -0.00008 
(0.00002)  (0.00002)  (0.00002) 
CARDIAC ARREST  -0.18747  -0.13073  -0.13198 
(0.02066)  (0.019)  (0.04177) 
DEFIBRILLATE  0.03532  0.0224  0.03799 
(0.00978)  (0.009)  (0.01115) 
Glasgow trauma score  (IS = least severe; 3 = most severe; 0 = unknown) 
GLASGOW 0  1.6977  1.14576  1.15614 
(0.23308)  (0.21527)  (0.26366) 
GLASGOW 3  1.65137  1.10733  1.1 1887 
(0.23483)  (0.21709)  (0.26567) 
GLASGOW 4-9  1.57387  1.00906  1.07255 
(0.23491)  (0.21707)  (0.26628) 
GLASGOW 10-12  1.73412  1.13965  1.14773 
(0.23446)  (0.2 166)  (0.26532) 
GLASGOW 13-1 4  1.73479  1.1562  1,16163 
(0.23255)  (0.21483)  (0.26326) 
GLASGOW 15  1.8255  1.23666  1.2426 
(0.23185)  (0.2  14  19)  (0.26224) 
Insurance status (excluded category = Medicare) 
MEDICAID  -0.1092  -0.07043  -  0.07683 
PRIVATE  0.04206  0.04077  0.04224 
SELF PAY  0.08497  0.08834  0.1 1029 
(0.02391)  (0.021  98)  (0.02741) 
(0.01  51)  (0,01388)  (0.01732) 













-  0.00002 
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(continued) Table 4.9  (continued) 
Dependent Variable = L TIME-TO-HOSPITAL 
Excluding  Only Counties 
Base  Time  4 Largest  with 91 1 
Regression  Controls  Counties  Level Changes 
(OLV  (OW  (OLS)  (Fixed Effects) 
OTHER  0.01589 
(0.02645) 
County hospital infrastructure 
CERT.  TRAUM CENTER 
L HOSP PER  SQ.  MILE 
L COUNTY CARDIAC 
PATIENTS 
County  demographics 
L POPULATION 
DENSIn 
L INCOME PER  CAP 
VCRIMERATE 
L POLICE EXP 
L HEALTH EXP 
Hospital characteristics 
URGENT CARE CENTER 
CATH LAB 
OPENHEART FAC 
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-0.18727 
-0.0008 1 

















0.0771  1 
(0.0157) 
-0.12268 
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sharply), and also when large counties are excluded and when only within- 
county changes are considered (although the result for changes from no 
91 1 to Basic 91 1 are weakened substantially in the within-county specif- 
ication). In future work, we  hope to consider interactions between En- 
hanced 9  1  1 and other allocation variables. 
We  find that travel times are longer for patients allocated to hospitals 
with a large number of doctors, residents (indicating teaching hospitals), 
and with cardiac catheterization laboratories. Thus, we  have  some evi- 
dence that patients with more severe indications are transported to higher 
quality, but more distant, hospitals. This is consistent with the official pro- 
tocols for patient allocation for Pennsylvania counties: According to the 
protocols, the most severe indications are to be  transported to hospitals 
with appropriate capabilities, while less severe indications are to be trans- 
ported to the nearest hospital. 
Also in contrast to the results on TIME-TO-SCENE,  we  see that the 
patient insurance mix affects the time it takes to transport patients to the 
hospital. Relative to Medicare patients (the majority of our sample), Med- 
icaid patients have  shorter  transport times. This may  partly reflect the 
fact that Medicaid patients are more likely to reside in the urban areas of 
their counties (though rural areas of Pennsylvania have Medicaid patients 
as well). It may also reflect a lack of patient choice: Better-insured patients 
may travel longer to get to a better hospital. Privately insured patients tend 
to travel longer, although this result is somewhat weaker. In addition to 
the possibility that these patients choose to travel to better hospitals, an 
alternative explanation is  that their insurance policies make some hos- 
pitals more desirable than others. For example, patients may  anticipate 
financial penalties from receiving treatment  from a hospital that is  not 
affiliated with their health plan. 
Having characterized the “intermediate inputs” to patient outcomes, we 
can now turn to assess the impact of 91 1 and hospital type on the proba- 
bility of dying from a cardiac incident requiring ambulance transporta- 
tion (fig. 4.4 and table 4.10). We begin with a simple reduced-form regres- 
sion of mortality on 91 1 as well as the controls from tables 4.7-4.9.  We do 
not find strong effects of 911  on mortality. There are several potential 
explanations for this result. One is that mortality rates are fairly low, and 
there are simply not enough deaths in the no 91 1 and Basic 91 1 counties 
to uncover the effects. Another possibility is that unobserved heterogene- 
ity across counties confounds the effects of response time (although our 
results are robust to a variety of county-level control variables). We do see 
that mortality is decreasing in the number of hospitals per mile and the 
income of a county, while it is increasing in the crime rate and police ex- 
penditures. 
In all of the specifications, we  find that older patients are less likely to 
die (they may also be more likely to use ambulance services in less severe Table 4.10  Mortality Equation 
Dependent Variable = Death Outcome Dummy 
Reduced  Base  Base 
(OLS)  (OW  (IVY 
Form  Regression  Regression 
Time outcomes 
L TIME-TO-SCENE  0.00535  0.03122 
(0.00268)  (0.0 1974) 
L TIME-AT-SCENE  0.01266  0.04073 
(0.00275)  (0.01434) 
L TIME-TO-HOSP  -0.00690  0.01896 
(0.00228)  (0.01 187) 
911 level 
~0911  -0.00 104 
(0.00658) 
BASIC 91  1  0.00030 
(0.00520) 
Patient characteristics 
MALE  0.00529  0.00591  0.00479 
(0.00322)  (0.00322)  (0.00329) 
(0.00080)  (0.00080)  (0.00083) 
AGE-SQUARED  0.00003  0.00003  0.00004 
(6.06 e-6)  (6.05 e-6)  (6.26 e-6) 
CARDIAC ARREST  0.01709  0.01271  0.02566 
(0.00693)  (0.00627)  (0.00718) 
DEFIBRILLATE  0.02500  0.02441  0.02149 
(0.00328)  (0.00326)  (0.00342) 
Glasgow trauma score (15 = least severe; 3 = most severe; 0 = unknown  and default) 
GLASGOW 3  0.3  1672  0.31605  0.30487 
(0,01177)  (0.01 146)  (0.01249) 
GLASGOW 4-9  0.19542  0.19380  0.19219 
(0.01485)  (0.01419)  (0.01 536) 
CLASGOW 10-12  0.11793  0.11838  0.11426 
(0.01423)  (0.01419)  (0.01449) 
GLASGOW 13-14  0.02183  0.02261  0.01969 
(0.01077)  (0.01071)  (0.01090) 
GLASGOW 15  -0.01625  -0.01459  -0.02021 
(0.00769)  (0.00762)  (0.00783) 
insurance status (excluded category = Medicare) 
MEDICAID  0.00943  0.00782  0.01291 
(0.00802)  (0.00800)  (0.00818) 
PRIVATE  0.01071  0.01 128  0.01 137 
(0.00507  j  (0.00505)  (0.00513) 
SELF PAY  0.01425  0.01500  0.01194 
(0.01479)  (0.01473)  (0.01498) 
OTHER  0.00219  -0.00022  0.00156 
(0.00887)  (0.00877)  (0.00886) 
AGE  -0.00281  -0.00276  -0.00352 Table 4.10  (continued) 
Dependent Variable = Death Outcome Dummy 
Reduced  Base  Base 
Form  Regression  Regression 
(OW  (OW  (IVY 
County hospital infrastructure 
CERT. TRAUM CNTR 
L HOSP PER  SQ.  MILE 





L INCOME PER CAP 
VCRIMERATE 
L POLICE EXP 
L HEALTH EXP 
Hospital characteristics 
URGENT CARE CENTER 
CATH LAB 
OPENHEART FAC 
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"Instruments: NO 911, BASIC 911, CERT.  TRAUM  CNTR, HOSP PER  SQ.  MILE,  L POPULATION, DEN- 
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situations), while patients for whom cardiac arrest and defibrillation are 
reported are more likely to die. Likewise, we  see a very strong effect of 
severity as measured  by  the Glasgow score: Sicker patients are signifi- 
cantly more likely to die than patients with less severe symptoms. Privately 
insured patients are more likely to die than Medicare patients. 
The second and third specifications consider the effects of response time 
and patient characteristics on mortality. We  have already shown that re- 
sponse time varies with the severity of the patient as well as with the kind 
of hospital to which the patient will eventually be admitted. Thus, it will 
be somewhat difficult to interpret the effects of the response time variables 
in the reduced-form mortality regression. We then propose a preliminary 
strategy for instrumental variables: We  use  county-level characteristics, 
and in particular the level of 911, as instruments for response time. We 
have already established that such characteristics affect the response time; 
it remains to argue that the level of 911 is uncorrelated  with the unex- 
plained variation in patient mortality (when patient-specific variables are 
included as controls in the regression). Our approach excludes all county- 
level demographic information from the regression; in future work, it may 
be possible to include zip-code-level demographic data to capture any het- 
erogeneity that  might  have been  correlated  with  excluded county-level 
demographics. 
Our instrumental variables results, while preliminary in nature, are sug- 
gestive. They show that shorter response times reduce the probability of 
death. The main coefficient that changes in sign as a result of the instru- 
mental variables approach is the coefficient on TIME-TO-HOSP.  It is not 
surprising that the coefficient changes in sign, since it is most sensitive to 
the severity of individual patients (in particular, patients with nonurgent 
symptoms are transported to the hospital without lights and sirens). It is 
interesting to note that the instrumental variables strategy is successful 
despite the fact that higher levels of 91 1 are (unconditionally) correlated 
with both lower response times and higher average mortality rates. 
We do not attempt an instrumental variables strategy for the technology 
of the hospital,  though  this is a potential area for future work. In our 
reduced-form  specification, it is difficult to separate out the potentially 
beneficial effect of  going to a better hospital from the effect due to the 
differential allocation of more severely ill patients and nonemergency pa- 
tients to better hospitals. 
4.6  The Role of Emergency Response Systems 
in Allocating Patients to Hospitals 
As described in  sections 4.1 and 4.2, the prehospital system plays an 
important role in allocating patients to hospitals.  However, one of the 
most critical factors in  determining a patient’s allocation is the simple The Adoption and Impact of Advanced Emergency Response Services  149 
Table 4.11  Distribution of In-Hospital Emergency and Cardiac Technologies 
In-Hospital Technology 
Certified 
Open Heart  Urgent  County 
Cath  Surgery  Care  Trauma 
Lab  Facility  Center  Center 
Total share of patients allocated to 
hospital with technology  0.6703  0.2940  0.2170  0.1983 
Share of patients living in counties 
with at least one hospital with 
technology  0.8243  0.6141  0.6055  0.5097 
Conditional share of patients 
allocated to hospitals with 
technology  0.8131  0.4787  0.3586  0.3892 
availability of a hospital with advanced technologies in his or her county. 
Table 4.1 1 shows that 80 percent of patients in our data set had within- 
county access to hospitals with cardiac catheterization laboratories, while 
only half had access to a certified county trauma center. Conditional on 
access to a hospital with  a cardiac catheterization laboratory, approxi- 
mately 80 percent of patients were allocated to such a hospital. The condi- 
tional probabilities of being allocated to hospitals with other features is 
substantially lower for the cardiac patients in our data set. Table 4.11 illus- 
trates that, as opposed to the more common situation where the primary 
barrier to access derives from a patient’s insurance status, a patient’s geo- 
graphical location may be the main determinant of whether a patient re- 
ceives treatment in a hospital with specialized cardiac care or emergency 
services. Patients in  poorer  and less-populated regions may not receive 
access to such care. 
In table 4.12, we  explore further the factors that affect allocation of 
patients to hospitals, conditional on availability of  the technology. The 
main result in this table is that for cardiac catheterization laboratories, the 
level of  91 1 significantly increases the probability of being admitted to a 
high-technology hospital (this result is robust to including controls for the 
number of hospitals in the county with cardiac catheterization laborator- 
ies). This is consistent with an important allocative role played by 91 1 cen- 
ters. 
We further find that, excluding the largest counties, patients with very 
severe and very mild indications were most likely to go to hospitals with 
high levels of technology. The result for less-severe patients could be due 
to the use of ambulances for cases that are more elective in nature, since 
patients may be reporting emergencies in order to have access to the am- 
bulances for basic transportation. Patient insurance status further affects 
the hospital allocation decision. We find that privately insured patients are Table 4.12  Patient Allocation Equation 
Dependent Variable = Allocated to Hospital 
with Cath Lab (Conditional on at Least One 
Cath Lab Hospital within County) 
Cath Lab  Excluding 4 
(Probit)  Largest Counties 
91  I  level 
~0911  -  1.00733  -  1.16728 
(0.06863)  (0.07387) 
(0.03050)  (0.03800) 
BASIC 91 I  -0.28051  -0.46803 
Patient characteristics 
-0.03312  -  0.00646  MALE 
(0.021  89)  (0.02860) 
(0.00562)  (0.00795) 
(0.00004)  (0.00006) 
(0.05086)  (0.10797) 
DEFIBRILLATE  -0.01392  0.01356 
(0.02256)  (0.03001) 
AGE  -0.00412  0.00091 
AGE-SQUARED  -  1.85 E-06  -0.00005 
CARDIAC ARREST  0.58741  -0.08791 
Glasgow trauma score (15 = least severe; 3 = most severe; 0 = unknown and default) 
GLASGOW 3  -0.84533  -0.37461 
(0.08582)  (0.13860) 
GLASGOW 4-9  -0.47575  -0.67050 
(0.10 140)  (0.14290) 
GLASGOW 10-12  -0.32729  -0.53630 
GLASGOW 13-14  -  0.37244  -0.411  17 
(0.10  122)  (0.13994) 
(0.07923)  (0.10938) 
(0.06085)  (0.08417) 
Insurance status (excluded category = Medicare) 
MEDICAID  0.18089  0.171265 
(0.05760)  (0.07802) 
(0.03485)  (0.04621) 
SELF PAY  0.11544  0.27962 
(0.09776)  (0.10839) 
(0.05842)  (0.08373) 
GLASGOW  15  -0.32983  -0.38695 
PRIVATE  0.04216  -0.00565 
-0.22751  -0.26058  OTHER 
County hospital infrastructure 
-0.19506  -0.66830  CERT.  TRAUM CENTER 
(0.04  1  09)  (0.05677) 
(0.03673)  (0.06159) 
(0.04060)  (0.05710) 
L HOSP PER  SQ.  MILE  -0.15402  -  1.15404 
L COUNTY CARDIAC PATIENTS  -0.09191  -0.13927 The Adoption and Impact of Advanced Emergency Response Services  151 
Table 4.12  (continued) 
Dependent Variable = Allocated to Hospital 
with Cath Lab (Conditional on at Least One 
Cath Lab Hospital Within County) 
Cath Lab  Excluding 4 





L INCOME PER CAP 
VCRIMERATE 




-  2.34760 
(0.1363  1) 
(0.01450) 
(0.10642) 
-  0.04246 
-0.39597 






















allocated in a similar fashion to Medicare patients. However, Medicaid 
and self-pay patients are more likely to be treated in high-tech hospitals. 
This result, which is somewhat puzzling, may be due to the fact that hospi- 
tals are often located in poor areas; further, this result may be spurious, 
as almost all patients are insured either privately or through Medicare. 
Table 4.12 also shows that the probability of being admitted to a hospi- 
tal with a cardiac catheterization laboratory is decreasing in the number 
of hospitals per square mile. We  interpret this result as a consequence of 
the allocation protocols: Patients are generally taken to the closest hospi- 
tal that meets general criteria, and areas with more hospitals per square 
mile may  have a number of  hospitals with low levels of  technology. In 
contrast, many counties have only two or three hospitals, one of which 
has a cardiac catheterization laboratory. 
Our final empirical exercise considers directly the incentives of hospitals 
to adopt higher levels of  technology. Identifying the role  that hospital 
characteristics play in determining the allocation of ambulance patients is 
in many ways similar to a study of a differentiated goods demand system, 
in which hospitals compete in the marketplace for patients on the basis of 
geography and characteristics. However, these two settings also differ in 
some respects; in particular, while hospitals will presumably have incen- 
tives to attract some ambulance patients, a given  hospital may  want to 152  Susan Athey and Scott Stern 
Table 4.13  Hospital Market Share Equation (excludes four largest counties) 
Dependent Variable = 
L Hospital Market Share 
~~ 




TRAUMA CENTER LEVEL 
HOSPITAL DOCTORS 
HOSPITAL RESIDENTS 
Intensity of rival hospital competition 
NO.  OF HOSPITALS 
AVERAGE URGENT CARE CENTER 
AVERAGE CATH LAB 
AVERAGE OPENHEART FAC 
AVERAGE TRAUMA CENTER LEVEL 
AVERAGE HOSPITAL DOCTORS 


































deter particular types of patients (the uninsured or patients who are hard- 
to-treat but do not generate significant income). While these distributional 
questions are extremely interesting, the present analysis will focus on the 
sensitivity of the overall patient share to particular hospital investments. 
Table 4.13 presents results that relate the proportion of a county’s pa- 
tients in the data set who are allocated to a given hospital, SHARE, to 
the characteristics of that hospital as well as the characteristics of  other 
hospitals in the county. First, and not surprisingly, the market share of a 
given hospital is declining in the total number of  hospitals present in a 
given county. Our more interesting results are derived from our analysis 
of the specific features of hospitals that seem to affect this market share. The Adoption and Impact of Advanced Emergency Response Services  153 
In particular, simple measures of the overall size of the hospital-the  to- 
tal number of physicians, the total number of hospital beds-are  uncor- 
related with the hospital market share. In contrast, specific technological 
investments (such as cardiac catheterization laboratories and the rating of 
the emergency room) are correlated with the overall market share. Since 
allocation does appear to respond to technology investment, we conclude 
that the interaction between the prehospital system and technology adop- 
tion should be considered in analyses of the incentives for investment by 
hospitals. 
One important caveat to our interpretation  of table 4.13 is that our 
results do not necessarily imply that if a given hospital increased its tech- 
nology, it would increase its market share. If our sample contains a hospi- 
tal characterized by  higher than average quality, larger numbers of con- 
sumers would use that hospital. The large market share could increase the 
incentives of the hospital to adopt technology; or it could be that technol- 
ogy is an integral part of maintaining high overall quality. In either case, 
a low-quality hospital that adopted sophisticated technology would not 
necessarily increase its market share. 
It is also possible to investigate how the sensitivity of market share to 
hospital characteristics might depend on the type of  prehospital emer- 
gency response system available in a given county. However, in our prelim- 
inary analysis of this data set, we  have not found a robust interaction ef- 
fect. 
4.7  Conclusions 
From our analysis in this paper, we  draw several conclusions that we 
hope will  have an impact on future research. First, our results highlight 
that emergency response systems play two distinct roles: productive and 
allocative. It therefore seems important to consider the potential bias that 
arises in studies that take allocation as exogenous or that do not account 
for the heterogeneity in county mortality rates that are induced by higher 
levels of  prehospital care (such as lower response times or on-the-scene 
defibrillation). Further, the incentives generated by the prehospital system 
need to be taken into account when regulators and insurance companies 
consider creating additional incentives for hospitals. Our analysis high- 
lights one particularly important feature of the prehospital system: It in- 
teracts with the incentives of  hospitals to adopt new  technologies and 
maintain highly rated emergency facilities. 
Our reduced-form results can be extended to provide a more structural 
understanding of  the interaction between the prehospital infrastructure 
and hospital competition. For example, we find that patients are allocated 
by  the prehospital system according to their severity and the technology 
that a hospital employs (see tables 4.12 and 4.13); it is left to future work 154  Susan Athey and Scott Stern 
to evaluate whether these allocative effects are reflected in terms of strate- 
gic investment behavior by hospitals. 
Examining 91 1 services also provides a glimpse into the challenges (and 
types of data) that are necessary for accurate measurement of productiv- 
ity in the service sector. In particular, service-sector productivity measure- 
ment must incorporate the quality of the activity (such as timeliness) as 
well as whether the services received by the customer are responsive to his 
or her idiosyncratic characteristics (in this case, different patients exper- 
ience different diagnoses and different degrees of severity of illness). By 
developing and analyzing a novel data set, we  are able to provide evidence 
about both of these factors (in this case, timely response and allocation of 
patients to appropriate hospitals). Of course, we  are not the first to evalu- 
ate multiple attributes of a service provided. However, our analysis is fur- 
ther able to connect these measures of  quality to a well-defined overall 
service outcome measure-mortality. 
Finally, a more careful understanding  of  the production  structure of 
services is an important first step toward analyzing the nature of strategic 
interactions between service providers. For example, the extent to which 
firms can influence their market share through overinvestment in technol- 
ogy and wasteful business-stealing activities will depend in part on the im- 
portance of customized service and the quality of the match between con- 
sumer characteristics and firm investments. These considerations might 
have implications for the regulation and management of service industries. 
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Comment on Chapters 3 and 4  Catherine Wolfram 
McClellan and Staiger 
Mark McClellan and Douglas Staiger present a new method for mea- 
suring hospital quality and then use their approach to consider quality 
differences across hospital  types. Using information  from nearly 4,000 
hospitals nationwide, they find that government and for-profit hospitals 
are lower quality than not-for-profit (heart patients at these hospitals are 
more likely to die within 90 days of treatment) and that high volume hospi- 
tals are higher quality than smaller hospitals. They also perform a more 
detailed case study of a handful of hospitals in three distinct markets, and 
they uncover an interesting correlate to their aggregate results. At least in 
Catherine Wolfram is assistant professor of economics at Harvard University and a faculty 
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the three markets they consider, for-profit hospitals did not have higher 
mortality rates than their not-for-profit competitors, and in one market, 
a for-profit firm entered by  taking over a low-quality hospital, but then 
raised the hospital’s quality level. Their findings could imply that for-profit 
hospitals are not lower quality (as the national results suggest), but that 
they selectively enter markets (that is, take over hospitals) where quality is 
low. Perhaps they even subsequently improve quality levels. 
Before discussing McClellan and Staiger’s findings, I will comment on 
their approach to measuring quality differences, as it is novel and affects 
their results. The authors identify three issues confronted by researchers 
attempting to assess hospital quality-data  availability, the ability to con- 
trol for the selection of patients across hospitals, and noise. Their study 
improves on past quality measures but addresses two of the three issues 
(data and noise) more thoroughly than the third (selection). 
The authors point out two shortcomings in the data currently collected 
by hospitals and health care providers for use in comparing hospital qual- 
ity. For one thing, many institutions do not systematically collect and dis- 
seminate measures of patient outcomes. Secondly, the data that are col- 
lected  often  cannot  be  used  to  make  meaningful  comparisons  across 
organizations, and worse, the convenient comparisons can be grossly mis- 
leading. In a particularly poignant example, the authors consider data that 
records each patient’s status at the time he or she is discharged from the 
hospital. If we assume (for expositional purposes) that all patients under- 
going a procedure performed in a hospital get worse over time, then hos- 
pitals or insurance plans that discharge their patients earlier would look 
better (i.e., they would report data on fewer sick patients) even if being dis- 
charged early reduced the patient’s chances of surviving 90 days after the 
procedure. 
McClellan and Staiger use Medicare records on all patients hospitalized 
for one of two heart-related illnesses between 1984 and 1991. Overall, their 
data include over one-half million observations. They avoid biases based 
on the length of a patient’s hospital  stay because their data set follows 
every patient through the 90th day following the initial hospitalization and 
records whether or not the patient dies. They then aggregate observations 
on patients to develop hospital-level mortality rates. 
One advantage to using mortality rates as a measure of quality is that 
deaths are easy outcomes to measure consistently across hospitals. Also, 
if mortality rates are systematically different across hospitals, presumably 
few people would willingly choose a low-quality hospital that was equiva- 
lent to other hospitals on other dimensions (e.g., cost or proximity). None- 
theless, by comparing hospitals only based on mortality rates, the authors 
do not capture the full range of attributes patients and their families are 
likely to value. For instance, McClellan and Staiger find that smaller hos- 
pitals generally have higher mortality rates (confirming previous research). Comment on Chapters 3 and 4  157 
If smaller hospitals provide other attributes that patients and their families 
value, such as more provider time, it is reasonable to think that rational, 
fully informed patients would choose a hospital with “lower quality” as 
measured by McClellan and Staiger. Since the authors are only capturing 
one dimension of quality, it may be unwise to use their results to make 
policy prescriptions, for instance, about the optimal hospital size. 
A second problem confronting most hospital quality measures that rely 
on patient outcomes is that the initial allocation of patients to hospitals is 
not random. In particular, measured quality differences are likely to un- 
derrepresent true differences if sicker patients tend to go to (or be taken 
to) better hospitals. McClellan and Staiger argue that by considering  heart 
disease, they are minimizing the problem since “urgency limits the oppor- 
tunities for selection across hospitals.” Compared to studies of other ill- 
nesses, this argument seems valid, though the paper by Athey and Stern in 
this volume suggests that some selection occurs even among heart patients 
brought to the hospital in an ambulance. Athey and Stern find evidence 
suggesting that sicker patients are more likely to be taken to hospitals with 
cardiac catheterization laboratories or trauma centers. In fact, ambulance 
operators follow strict protocols when they make decisions on allocating 
patients and are only allowed to take patients to a hospital other than the 
nearest one under prespecified conditions. As a result, selection is most 
likely limited to observables on the hospital type, for instance, whether or 
not it has a trauma center. Since McClellan and Staiger’s main focus is on 
comparing hospitals by type, any such selection will only be problematic 
to the extent that, for instance, not-for-profit hospitals are more likely to 
have trauma centers and so are allocated the sicker patients. Controlling 
for technological differences across hospitals is probably feasible, particu- 
larly in the case studies performed by the authors. 
In addition to explicit selection based on a patient’s status at hospital- 
ization, different hospitals may be located near patients with different 
demographic characteristics. In developing their risk-adjusted mortality 
measures (RAMRs), the authors control for several patient characteris- 
tics, including age and gender. Still, it is possible that other attributes of 
the patients, related to their ability to survive a heart incident, could differ 
systematically across hospital types. For instance, if government hospitals 
are more likely to treat veterans and veterans are more likely to smoke 
than other men  of  similar ages, McClellan and Staiger’s methodology 
would assign government hospitals higher RAMR measures. It is impor- 
tant to note that the adjustments that McClellan and Staiger make to 
develop the filtered RAMR will not account for systematic differences 
across hospitals. In fact, by  combining information from different years, 
they will tend to exacerbate them (by making the differences appear more 
precisely estimated). Though their measure seems a marked improvement 
over existing measures in the literature, we  should still be a little wary 158  Comment on Chapters 3 and 4 
about interpreting differences across their mortality measures as differ- 
ences in hospital “quality” since hospital selection is still an issue. 
The likelihood that a patient survives a heart attack is a function of  a 
number of factors, including the treatment he or she receives at the hospi- 
tal, his or her age, gender, overall health status, and simple luck. Assuming 
that the authors could control for all meaningful differences across pa- 
tients (in other words, leaving the issues addressed in the last paragraph 
aside), it is still difficult to disentangle the extent to which one hospital 
provides better care than another from the different patients’ luck. For 
instance, if one hospital admitted 10 heart attack patients over the course 
of a year and 4 of them died within 90 days and another hospital admitted 
10 and 3 of them died, can we conclude that the second hospital provides 
superior care, or are we  simply observing that one more patient at that 
hospital was lucky? Similarly, if  one hospital had 3 out of  10 die and one 
had 31 out of 100, how do we  compare the two hospitals? 
The methodology that McClellan and Staiger present in section 3.3 of 
their paper is designed to minimize the noise in the quality measures (i.e., 
minimize the role played by  luck) and distill information on persistent 
differences across hospitals. Two main features of their methodology are 
to adjust for the degrees of freedom by weighting measures by their preci- 
sion, (so that 31 out of  100 is given more emphasis than 3 out of  10) and 
to use information from adjoining years and a related illness. 
The implications of McClellan and Staiger’s case studies-that  for-profit 
hospitals may  appear lower quality than not-for-profit because they are 
choosing to convert low-quality hospitals-is  certainly a topic worthy of 
further research. At times the authors place a very strict interpretation of 
quality on their filtered RAMR measure as something that is completely 
under the control of hospital managers and is, for instance, unaffected by 
local demographics. Taking this interpretation, we  would need to look for 
evidence that for-profit managers choose to convert low-quality hospitals 
in order to support the implications of their case studies. If we  use a less 
strict interpretation of their quality measures, we could confirm their case 
study results by finding evidence that for-profit hospitals tend to locate in 
regions where (age- and gender-adjusted) mortality rates are higher. 
It might also be interesting to consider the competitive dynamics be- 
tween hospitals of different quality levels. For instance, if for-profit hospi- 
tals improve the quality of the hospitals they take over, do other hospitals 
in the local market become better? Along those lines, it would be interest- 
ing to see if  further research could explain McClellan and Staiger’s find- 
ings that mortality rates have fallen over time. 
Athey and Stern 
Susan Athey and Scott Stern have gathered an extensive new data set on 
91 1 systems across the United States and, containing more detail, within Comment on Chapters 3 and 4  159 
Pennsylvania. In the paper included in this volume, they lay out some of 
the basic relationships between the level of 911 service a county adopts, 
ambulance response times within the county, the technology available at 
the hospitals to which ambulances bring patients, and patients’ eventual 
outcomes. They uncover a number of intriguing patterns, and their results 
touch on many issues of interest to health care economists, including the 
role of technology in health outcomes and the extent to which similar pa- 
tients are allocated to hospitals with different technological capabilities. 
In these comments, I first give an overview of the paper and discuss some 
of the individual results, and then I comment on the implications the re- 
sults have for some broader health care policy and economic questions. 
While the authors show responsible restraint in drawing conclusions from 
their results, I will  suggest ways in which the results can be pushed to 
answer relevant policy questions. 
At a fundamental level, the authors are concerned with the effect that 
91 1 technologies have on the likelihood that a patient suffering cardiac 
arrest survives. There are a number of different reasons to believe that 91 1 
would impact patient outcomes, and there are a number of factors po- 
tentially at play.  For example, the authors point out that the local 911 
infrastructure may affect local hospitals’ decisions about the type of car- 
diac care technology in which to invest. Though the possible links between 
91 1 technology levels and patient outcomes are complex, Athey and Stern 
have gathered enough information to disentangle much of what is going 
on. Table 4C.1 provides a schematic guide to the types of outcomes and 
decisions the authors consider. The columns of the table indicate the suc- 
cessive decisions that are made affecting a cardiac patient’s chances of 
survival after calling 9  1  1. Each step is delineated in the row labeled “Out- 
come,” the potential outcomes are listed in the row labeled “Possibilities” 
and several representative factors affecting the possibility that is realized 
are listed in the row labeled “Factors Affecting Outcome.” 
As column 1 of table 4C.1 depicts, all U.S. counties have adopted one 
of three levels of 91 1 technology (see their article for a description of the 
different choices). In tables 4.4 and 4.5, Athey and Stern consider covari- 
ates with county decisions in, respectively, Pennsylvania and the United 
States. As 91 1 service is a local public good, the framework they use is 
akin to median voter models that others have used to explore local heter- 
ogeneity in, for instance, education expenditures. They include factors 
likely to affect the relative prices of service from the different 91 1 technol- 
ogy levels (for example, population density, crime rate), income per capita 
and various demographic factors essentially as proxies for the median vot- 
ers’ tastes (for example, percent of Perot voters in the 1992 election). Their 
results are not that surprising-indicating,  for instance, that more popu- 
lous, richer counties are more likely to adopt more elaborate 91 1 systems. 
The results at the national level in table 4.5 should be interpreted with Table 4C.1  Decisions Affecting the Treatment of a Cardiac Patient Who Calls 911 
Outcome 
91 1 Service Adopted  Ambulance Response  Treatment on  Transport to  Treatment at 
by  County  to Initial Call  Premises  Hospital  Hospital 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Possibilities  Nothing; basic;  Slow to fast  None to  Slow (better  Patient lives or dies 
E911  defibrillators  hospital), fast 
(closest hospital) 
Factors affecting  County geography;  91 1 service; county  Severity of patient  Severity of patient  Type of hospital; 
outcomes  demographics;  geography  illness  illness; county  prior defibrillation 
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caution since the authors only have data from 772 counties (out of the 
universe of 3,000+ counties in the United States), all of which have self- 
selected by responding to a survey on the local 911 capabilities. The au- 
thors point out that the counties that responded to the national survey 
were more likely to have E911 than the counties in Pennsylvania (where 
the authors observe the universe of  counties), and that selection could 
be biasing the coefficients reported in table 4.5. For instance, while most 
counties with E911 respond to the survey, it seems plausible that only 
counties with high levels of local services (potentially proxied by  police 
expenditures in table 4.5) would have staff with time to respond. Consis- 
tent with that, the negative relationship between police expenditures and 
91 1 service level found in table 4.5 is reversed in table 4.4 when the authors 
consider Pennsylvania. 
Next, the authors consider the impact of the level of 91 1 service on the 
time it takes an ambulance to reach a patient, the time the ambulance 
team stays at the scene, and the time it takes the ambulance to drive the 
patient to the hospital (the relationships represented in table 4C. 1 in col- 
umns 2, 3, and 4). Regression results are presented in tables 4.7, 4.8, and 
4.9, and variable means by county technology level are presented in table 
4.6. Consider first the relationship between the county’s 91 1 service level 
and the time to scene. Here, the direct effect is relatively uncomplicated: 
All else equal, we  would expect that higher levels of 911 technology will 
permit ambulances to reach patients sooner,’ so we expect the coefficient 
on the variable “no 911” to be positive and larger than the positive co- 
efficient on “Basic 91 1  ,” suggesting that Enhanced 9  1  1 is generally quicker. 
Table 4C.1 indicates one potential problem with uncovering such a rela- 
tionship across counties. Factors such as the county geography or popula- 
tion density may be correlated both with the benefits of better 91 1 service 
and with the speed it would take any ambulance (dispatched from a so- 
phisticated 91 l center or not) to reach a patient. That could create a spuri- 
ous correlation (positive in the example given) between the 91 1 technology 
level and the time to scene. 
The authors control for some unobserved county heterogeneity by  in- 
cluding county-level controls. They also devise individual-level  controls by 
including the variables “time at scene” and “time to hospital” in some 
specifications in table 4.7. They reason that if it initially takes an ambu- 
lance longer to reach a person in a remote location, it would also take 
longer to get the person to the hospital. The second solution is clever and 
basically sound, though it could be problematic if, for instance, decisions 
1. The authors do point out one complication to the direct effects as I have stated them, 
suggesting that the ambulances carrying defibrillators may be more common in counties 
with E911 and that the 91 1 dispatcher may sacrifice time getting the ambulance to scene in 
order to find such a vehicle. Such countervailing effects seem much more important in the 
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about whether to bring the patient to the closest hospital are affected by 
the time it takes the ambulance to arrive on the scene. (For instance, if the 
ambulance gets lost and so takes a long time to arrive at the scene, it might 
choose to bring the patient to the nearest hospital rather than spending 
time to drive to a better equipped but more distant hospital.)2 
The relationship between 91 1 and both the time the paramedics spend 
at the scene and the time to hospital are complicated both because the 
types of omitted variable biases described above might exist and also be- 
cause there are factors pushing the direct relationship in both directions. 
For one thing, ambulances often face a trade-off between bringing the 
patient to the closest hospital and bringing him or her to a more distant 
but better-equipped facility. If E911 allows ambulances to reach patients 
quicker initially, the time saved may  permit more trips to distant (but 
better-equipped) hospitals. Such an effect would cause E911 to look less 
efficient. The coefficients on the 91 1 service level variables in tables 4.8 and 
4.9 do give an indication of the net effect of all factors. So, for instance, the 
positive coefficients on “no 91 1” and “Basic 91 1” suggest that the above- 
mentioned effect is less important than the fact that E911 helps ambu- 
lances navigate more efficiently to the nearest hospital. 
Interestingly, the results in table 4.9 suggest that patients transported to 
better-equipped hospitals (e.g., with cardiac catheterization laboratories) 
have longer travel times, suggesting that patients are not simply taken to 
the nearest hospital and that better-equipped hospitals may be receiving 
sicker  patient^.^ Taking off  on this result, Athey and Stern analyze the 
probability that a patient is allocated to a hospital with a cardiac catheter- 
ization laboratory as a function of the 91 1 service level in table 4.12. They 
document a strong relationship between enhanced 911 and a patient’s 
chances of going to a hospital with a catheterization laboratory (condi- 
tional on the county having at least one such hospital). Again, however, 
those results may reflect unobserved heterogeneity across counties, for ex- 
ample, in the proximity of such labs to the average cardiac patient. Con- 
firming the pattern, though, the authors find that a hospital’s level of tech- 
nological sophistication (for heart patient treatment) affects its share of 
cardiac care patients brought to it by ambulances. 
Athey and Stern note the possibility that 91 1 technology affects a hospi- 
tal’s decisions about the level of technology in which to invest, but they 
do not consider it empirically. (This decision is not reflected in table 4C. 1, 
2. The authors also examine the relationship between 91 1 level and time to scene using 
county fixed effects, so that their results are identified off of changes in the time-to-scene in 
counties that changed the level of 91 1 service they provide. These results should be inter- 
preted with extreme caution since it appears that only one county changed from Basic 91 1 
to Enhanced 91 1 and fewer than five changed from no 91 1 to the basic service. 
3. The coefficients on the Glasgow scores-providing  direct measures of a patient’s sick- 
ness-suggest  that sicker patients have longer travel times over a certain score range, though 
the standard errors on the coefficients are bigger than the differences between them. Comment on Chapters 3 and 4  163 
though would impact the possibilities listed in column 4.)  To the extent 
that 91 1 service levels have important implications for the way  in which 
patients are allocated to hospitals, this promises to be a fruitful path for 
future research. 
The authors also consider the overall impact of the level of 91 1 technol- 
ogy  on patient mortality rates (see table 4.10). The overall relationship 
between 91 1 technology and mortality will reflect the balance of all of the 
factors documented in columns 2 through 5 of table 4C. 1. Unfortunately, 
they are unable to discern a strong effect of 91 1 service level on mortality 
and offer several plausible explanations for that result (among them that 
mortality rates are extremely noisy, an issue addressed in the McClellan 
and Staiger paper in this volume). Taking the analysis one step forward 
(to column 2 in table 4C.1), however, they find that slower ambulance re- 
sponses are associated with higher mortality rates. In a clever use of their 
previous findings, they also use the county’s 91  1 service level as an instru- 
ment for ambulance transportation times and confirm the relationship 
between time and mortality that has been documented by  previous re- 
searchers. (The instrumental variables specifications in table 4.10 also use 
dummy variables indicating whether or not the county has a catheteriza- 
tion laboratory or a trauma center as instruments. The argument for ex- 
cluding these from the mortality equation is less clear.) Comparing the 
two sets of results, it is somewhat puzzling that the timing results are so 
much stronger than the 9 11 service levels. 
Athey and Stern’s work provides new insights on several issues. The 
authors have pulled together a rich data set with uncommonly detailed 
measures of the productivity of a particular health care technology. The 
level of detail they are working with permits them to show that while the 
relationship between 91 1 and mortality is muddied by a number of factors, 
there is a clear relationship between investment in 911 technology and 
the time to the scene. Their coefficients suggest that having enhanced 9 1  1 
services reduces the average response times by 5 percent, or at the mean 
response time, by about 30 seconds. With such direct evidence on the ben- 
efits provided by  a technology, it is hard to pass up the opportunity to 
compare the benefits to the costs. Rapidly increasing investments in tech- 
nology have been blamed for the increase in health care costs over the past 
several decades (see, e.g., Newhouse 1992). While 911 is just one technol- 
ogy and it is difficult to draw any general conclusions (in all probability, 
county-level governments face different incentives to invest in technology 
and encourage its use than, for instance, hospitals), it would be interesting 
to see what the implicit cost of the new technology is per life saved. Table 
4.10 provides estimates of the effect a reduction in the time to scene has 
on the probability a patient dies (and the authors cite clinical studies that 
give similar measures), and table 4.7 documents the effect of 91 I service 
level on the time to scene. With more information like that provided for 164  Comment on Chapters 3 and 4 
Berks County on the cost of 91 1 systems, one could estimate the implicit 
cost per life saved. (Such a calculation could almost be done based on the 
information provided in the paper currently. One important missing factor 
is the number of ambulance trips in Berks County.) 
To complete the accounting of the impact of 91 1 investments on patient 
lives saved, one would need to account for the authors’ results on technol- 
ogy adoption by hospitals. For instance, if elaborate and highly productive 
91 1 systems cause hospitals to engage in technology races and overinvest 
in catheterization laboratories, the overall benefits would be reduced. 
A second notable result in this paper is the concrete evidence it provides 
on the extent to which different patients are allocated to hospitals with 
different technology levels.  For instance, the results in table 4.9 suggest 
that patients that are brought to hospitals with better facilities are more 
likely to have longer ambulance rides to the hospital, and table 4.12 sug- 
gests that patients have a better chance of getting to a hospital with higher 
technological capabilities if the local county has E911. Both results sug- 
gests that even with a life-threatening,  time-sensitive disease, patients with 
different unconditional probabilities of survival are allocated to different 
hospitals. That result suggests that any attempts to compare outcomes 
across hospitals that do not control for patient selection issues should be 
viewed with caution. It also emphasizes the value of efforts to control for 
initial allocation of patients (e.g., McClellan and Newhouse 1997). 
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Comment on Chapters 3 and 4  Karen Norberg 
In a way, the two papers in this section are both concerned with the adop- 
tion of new information technologies: Athey and Stern have studied the 
adoption of  an enhanced 911 technology that changes the delivery of 
ambulance-based emergency  care  and  transport,  and  McClellan  and 
Staiger have introduced a new statistical method that may  improve the 
comparison of quality among hospitals. 
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Athey and Stern 
In out-of-hospital cardiac arrest, the time between collapse and initi- 
ation of CPR is an important determinant of the likelihood of  survival 
(Berek et al. 1997). There is wide variation across the United States in the 
level of 91 1 emergency services provided within the community. The most 
recent advance, known as Enhanced 91 1, involves the automatic identifi- 
cation of the address from which a call is made, and a database of informa- 
tion about the location of all addresses in the community. Athey and Stern 
find that an ambulance arrives at the scene of a cardiac arrest about 5 
percent faster, and the patient is transported from the scene to the hospital 
about 10 percent faster, in Pennsylvania counties with Enhanced 91 1 com- 
pared to other levels of service. Protocols for 911 services specify that 
sicker patients are taken to hospitals with higher levels of specialization, 
and higher levels of 9 1  1 technology resulted in more discrimination about 
which patient is taken to which hospital. 
Why do some communities adopt Basic or Enhanced 911 technology 
while some do not? Presumably, the counties that have adopted enhanced 
91 1 are those that could afford the investment, and whose public officials 
believed that the technology would significantly benefit the county. Al- 
though a community’s demand for Enhanced 91 l services may be driven 
by the desire for crime or fire protection as well as by a demand for emer- 
gency medical service, the most significant predictors of level of 91 1 adop- 
tion appear to be county population, per capita income, and general polit- 
ical orientation toward government services. 
McClellan and Staiger 
Different hospital markets may be characterized by different levels of 
emergency medical service infrastructure, different community standards 
of care, different degrees of  competition, different demographics, and 
different prevalence of illness. Such community differences may confound 
efforts to study the effects of hospital quality in a national sample. McClel- 
lan and Staiger introduce the use of a “filtered” risk-adjusted mortality 
rate (RAMR) to compare the outcomes of patients admitted with acute 
myocardial infarction. This filtered RAMR yields a much higher signal- 
to-noise ratio than ordinary methods, and makes it possible to compare 
individual hospitals within the same market with much greater confidence 
in the meaningfulness of the comparisons that are made. 
Like other investigators, McClellan and Staiger find that for-profit and 
government hospitals have higher mortality than not-for-profit in their 
national sample. Their three case studies suggest a more complicated pic- 
ture. In case 1, the two for-profit hospitals had lower mortality than the 
others in the community. In case 2, there were improvements in the mortal- 166  Comment on Chapters 3 and 4 
ity rates of hospital 2 at the times of two different purchases by two differ- 
ent for-profit chains; and in case 3, the two hospitals that changed own- 
ership  also  showed the  greatest improvements in  mortality,  but  these 
changes in ownership involved a  transition  from government and for- 
profit to not-for-profit status. 
Cases 1 and 2 are consistent with the hypothesis that for-profit hospitals 
may be more likely to enter markets where lower quality management has 
created attractive takeover opportunities; although they may, on average, 
be functioning in markets with lower average quality, some for-profit hos- 
pitals could provide higher than average services within their markets. 
Case 3 reminds us that any change in hospital ownership could be asso- 
ciated with improvement in productivity in  the short run; the fact of a 
change in ownership implies that both buyer and seller foresaw an oppor- 
tunity for benefit in the exchange. There are a great many public concerns 
about for-profit hospitals that are not explored in the present study; in 
any case, we  cannot draw systematic conclusions about for-profit hospital 
ownership and quality of care from just three examples, but the case stud- 
ies are enough to point out the hazard of oversimplified conclusions from 
aggregate national data. 
McClellan and Staiger’s filtered RAMR results in a dramatic reduction 
in the “noise” associated with mortality as a quality-of-care outcome mea- 
sure. However, their method is subject to all of the other problems with 
risk  adjustment, and a few  caveats about generalizability. It is  easy to 
imagine a study such as this one becoming the basis for a public quality- 
of-care “report card” in a particular hospital market. Clinicians, in partic- 
ular, are notoriously skeptical of such report cards (Angel1 and Kassirer 
1996; Chassin  1996; Epstein 1998). There are two principal reasons for 
this skepticism. 
First, risk adjustment is hard to do well. In many clinical conditions, 
the patient’s illness and other characteristics are much stronger predictors 
of outcome than are any nuances of  medical intervention; differences in 
the case mix between hospitals may overshadow the effects of any true 
differences in the quality of care. However, the only risk factors that can 
be entered into a regression are those that have been measured. Adminis- 
trative and clinical records may be sketchy about known clinical risk fac- 
tors, and of  course, they cannot account  for risk  factors that are still 
unknown. Instrumental variables are an alternative way around this prob- 
lem; process measures, rather than mortality, may also be less confounded 
by  problems of  patient  selection (Brook, McGlynn,  and  Cleary  1996; 
Chen et al. 1999). 
Second, based on a study such as this one, it may be tempting to make 
generalizations about quality of care in for-profit hospitals. However, insti- 
tutional quality in one outcome may or may not be correlated with institu- 
tional quality in another outcome. A hospital’s neonatal mortality  rate Comment on Chapters 3 and 4  167 
may be unrelated to its mortality rate from acute myocardial infarctions; 
its cardiac surgery service may have a different reputation from its ortho- 
pedics. Hospitals may offer high-quality care as a “loss leader” in services 
(such as cardiac care) where there may be significant market competition, 
and may provide lower quality care in services for which there is less com- 
petition. As Athey and Stern point out, hospitals may compete based on 
the criteria used by  the emergency services that provide patient referrals. 
Regulators, of course, hope that the use of public report cards will lead to 
higher quality of  care in the services reported, but this may  be accom- 
plished by  lowering the quality of  care in services that are not publicly 
reported. The qualities surveyed will depend on feasibility and on the pri- 
orities of the agency collecting the information; the feasibility of collecting 
certain information depends on existing administrative infrastructures, 
which themselves reflect the past priorities of the public and private insti- 
tutions involved. For better or for worse, single-focus report cards may 
increase the influence of the targeted services within the hospitals in the 
community, as the general reputation of each institution may depend on 
the performance of its most visible department. 
Most hospital quality information is collected by single entities, such as 
hospitals, insurers, or health maintenance organizations. Such informa- 
tion is usually treated as highly confidential, and it is unclear how often 
such agencies are able to use the information in a way that actually leads 
to quality improvement. Higher quality studies, with more sensitive and 
stable measures, may improve the credibility of internally collected data 
and may increase the acceptability of public reporting among clinicians 
and provider institutions. 
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